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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
A. Statement of the Problem 
At the end of the Cold War, the government of Mali, like governments across Africa, 
faced increased pressure from international donors and domestic civil society to undertake 
democratic reforms.  In one notable policy shift, French President François Mitterrand made 
clear to his African counterparts at the June 1990 Franco-African summit, that while France was 
committed to supporting its former colonies through the economic crisis that gripped much of 
Africa, it would give aid more liberally to countries that embraced democratic reforms.  Within 
Mali, workers’ and students’ unions increasingly voiced their displeasure with the single-party 
regime of President Moussa Traoré while pro-democracy forces continued to press their demand 
for multiparty elections.  Ultimately, in March 1991, the head of the presidential guard, then 
Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (popularly known as ATT), arrested President 
Traoré in response to nationwide protests that followed the government’s violent suppression of 
student demonstrations in the capital, Bamako.  
ATT oversaw the yearlong transition to democracy as leader of the Comité de Transition 
pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP) that included civilian and military representatives.  As did many 
Francophone African countries undertaking democratic transitions at the time, the CTSP invited 
delegates from civil society, government, and the military to draft a new constitution for the 
country at Mali’s National Conference held from 29 July to 13 August 1991.  Alpha Oumar 
Konaré, one of the leaders of the democratic movement in Mali, was elected president in April 
1992, and, after his investiture in June, he quickly moved to make decentralization one of the 
	   2	  
priorities of his administration.  Approximately six months after his inauguration, in January 
1993, Konaré created the Mission de Décentralisation (MD) by presidential decree and tasked it 
with designing reforms that would transfer significant power from the central government to new 
subnational governments.  According to Isaline Bergamashi (2008, 219), decentralization 
became “the biggest output of Konaré’s two electoral mandates” from 1992 to 2002 and 
“dominated” his national development strategy.  Multiple scholars cite the Konaré 
administration’s concerted push for decentralization in Mali as a notable example of the latest 
wave of decentralization on the African continent.  
The primary objective of this thesis is to understand why the Konaré administration 
aggressively pursued decentralization reforms in Mali.  It will assess the local, national, and 
global forces that prompted the new government to implement decentralization reforms in the 
1990s and consider how the administration’s political motivations for decentralization impacted 
those reforms.  Though a large body of literature has developed around the decentralization of 
state institutions in Mali, much of the literature approaches decentralization from a 
“technocratic” viewpoint “in which decentralization is equated with the task of designing 
appropriate institutions” (Heller 2001, 136).  Within this framework, it is largely taken for 
granted that the state transfers power and resources to subnational governments through 
decentralization because government leaders recognize the benefits that should theoretically flow 
from these reforms.  The most widely recognized benefits of decentralization include improved 
governance and development, which are the stated objectives of “virtually all decentralization 
reforms” undertaken across Africa (Ribot 2002, 7; see also Boone 2003b).  In reality, however, 
decentralization is a complicated political process, and government leaders promote 
decentralization reforms in response to multiple political imperatives that impact the design and 
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implementation of reforms.  According to Dele Olowu and James Wunsch (2004, 29), “any 
analysis of decentralization policies… in Africa must be rooted in an appreciation of the political 
realities that produce such policies.”  In Mali, I argue that while donor support for 
decentralization helped to spur the reforms forward in the 1990s, the overarching reason Konaré 
pursued decentralization was to legitimize the Malian government during a period of economic 
and political crisis.  
 
B. Justification for Research 
A more complete understanding of why the Konaré administration embarked on 
decentralization reforms in the 1990s is necessary to better understand the reforms and their 
impact.  Recent USAID reports have evaluated the status of the implementation of 
decentralization reforms throughout the country and the impact the reforms have had on 
democratic governance and service delivery (see Wing and Kassibo 2010 and Coulibaly, 
Dickovick, and Thomson 2011).  A number of scholars have also assessed the impact these 
reforms have had on local communities and local politics (see Fay 2000, Djiré 2004, Gaasholt 
2003, Hetland 2008, and Mauxion 2012).  However, like much of the literature on 
decentralization in Africa, recent scholarship on decentralization in Mali “tends to neglect the 
political underpinnings” of these reforms (Ndegwa and Levy 2004, 284).     
This thesis focuses on one small aspect of decentralization, and I am very aware that 
there are multiple “intervening factors” that impact decentralization and its outcomes including 
the larger historical, political, social, and economic context (Oxhorn 2004, 301).  However, I 
believe an in-depth understanding of the political reasons why the Konaré administration pursued 
ambitious decentralization reforms is of interest to multiple stakeholders.  Political scientists are 
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generally interested in understanding why the governments of developing countries like Mali 
increasingly sought to decentralize in the 1980s and 1990s even though decentralization seems to 
run counter to the preference of many leaders to maintain centralized control of power and 
resources.  Policy makers are interested in the subject because, as Jennifer Seely (2001, 519) 
points out, not only does the political context impact the design of decentralization reforms, but 
“political considerations can affect the extent and implementation of decentralization” and, 
ultimately, impact outcomes.  Political analyses of decentralization complement policy analyses 
and can offer additional insight into the success or failure of reforms that policy analyses 
conducted from a “normative, administrative standpoint” might miss (501).  According to Philip 
Oxhorn,  
motivations do not always determine outcomes but the multiple and contradictory 
motivations for decentralization shed light on the complexity of the process and 
suggest that we should not be surprised to find multiple and contradictory 
outcomes as well… decentralization… almost always has been pursued by 
national elites for a mixture of reasons, including strengthening democracy, 
directing attention away from national demands for democracy, making 
government more efficient, and reducing state expenditures.  National leaders 
have often held several of these objectives simultaneously and pursued 
decentralization as a favorite strategy to address a series of highly distinct  
objectives. (2004, 301)   
 
Finally, I believe this research is timely considering that current President Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keita (popularly known as IBK) has proposed increased decentralization as one way to 
solve the political crisis in Mali and address the “Tuareg problem,” which reached another crisis 
point in 2012.  Decentralization had “progressively lost steam as mobilizing project” under 
ATT’s administration between 2002 and 2012, but it has since reemerged as a dominant theme 
within national discourse.  Both Malian and international observers have argued that 
consolidation of the decentralization project is necessary to foster national reconstruction and 
reconciliation in the country following the 2012 Tuareg rebellion and coup d’état (see 
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Association des Municipalités du Mali (AMM) 2012; Sy 2012; Wing 2012; Armstrong 2013).  
The transitional government identified decentralization as a necessary step to reunify Mali in its 
“Roadmap for the Transition” (République du Mali 2013), and, at an international donor 
conference, “Together for a New Mali,” held in May 2013, donors, “stressed the need to 
establish genuine democracy and decentralization” as they pledged approximately $4 billion in 
foreign assistance to the country (Stamatoukou 2013).  Most recently, in April 2014, Ousmane 
Sy, who led decentralization efforts under the Konaré administration as director of the MD and 
later led the Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales (MATCL), 
was appointed Ministre de la Décentralisation et de la Ville within Prime Minister Moussa 
Mara’s new government.  Since then, the so-called “father of Malian decentralization” (Segbedji, 
2014a), has moved steadily ahead with reforms designed to strengthen decentralization in the 
country. 
 
C. Literature Review  
 At the most general level, decentralization is defined as the transfer of power or authority 
from a central government to subnational units of government or subnational governments.  The 
literature makes important distinctions between different types of decentralization.  
Deconcentration is the weakest form of decentralization in which some power is transferred to 
subnational units of government that remain accountable to the central state.  Devolution, or 
democratic decentralization, is the most complete form of decentralization.  It produces 
subnational governments rather than just reproducing subnational units of the central government 
at local and intermediate levels.  Ideally, through devolution, a central government grants 
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significant decision-making power and the financial resources necessary to implement those 
decisions to subnational governments that are accountable to the population through elections.   
 As Jesse Ribot (2002, 2) has written, “the underlying developmentalist logic of 
decentralization is that local institutions can better discern, and are more likely to respond to 
local needs and aspirations” thereby producing better governance and development outcomes.  
However, while deconcentration and devolution may “share equity and efficiency objectives” (2-
3), scholars agree that the actual impact of deconcentration is to increase the power of the central 
state.  Some scholars have rejected the classification of deconcentration as a valid from of 
decentralization for this reason.  According to Olowu and Wunsch (2004, 4), “decentralization 
reforms only make sense if they lead to… effective local governance,” and devolution is the only 
form of decentralization that has the potential to do so.  For this thesis, though, at times, I 
generally use the term decentralization as I discuss the different decentralizations that have 
occurred in Mali since colonization, I am careful to distinguish between the kinds of structures 
produced by these various decentralizations.   
 In the 1980s and 1990s, decentralization became an increasingly popular concept not 
only on the African continent, but in developing countries around the world.  Political elite of 
developing countries, scholars, and development practitioners became excited about the promise 
of decentralization reforms, which, promoted by international discourse, were increasingly 
designed as devolution.  In Africa, some scholars argued, decentralization would address many 
of the problems governments faced, including “ethnic conflict, political inefficacy, 
administrative weakness, and economic stagnation,” by tapping into “a vast reservoir of energy 
and potential” at the grassroots (Wunsch and Olowu 1990, 3). 
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 However, it is important to remember that the decentralization reforms introduced across 
Africa since the end of the Cold War are only the latest wave of reforms to be adopted on the 
continent.  According to Ribot and Phil René Oyono (2005, 206), “decentralization reforms have 
occurred in Africa under colonial rule, military regimes and democratic governments.”  As 
Mahmood Mamdani (1996) has argued, the decentralized state is one of the major legacies of 
colonial rule in Africa.  Both the British and the French ruled their colonial subjects through 
African intermediaries at the local level who administered systems of forced labor and taxation 
designed by European administrators.  Termed “decentralized despotism” by Mamdani, the 
colonial powers developed these deconcentrated systems of administration to “stabilize” their 
“alien rule” (3).  
Following World War II, the French and the British created some local and regional 
governments in their African colonies and ultimately moved to devolve significant powers to 
these governments as a last attempt to preserve their control, but these efforts came too late to 
save the colonial system.  Initially, it seemed that the African leaders who came to power after 
independence might carry on the decentralization reforms initiated during the late colonial 
period.  However, the single party and military regimes that emerged not long after independence 
quickly moved to recentralize power.  As Mamdani (1996, 26) has argued, in many of these 
newly independent states, “the antidote to a decentralized despotism turned out to be a 
centralized despotism.”  Where leaders introduced decentralization policies during the immediate 
post-colonial period, most “were merely attempts at window dressing increasing centralization” 
(Olowu and Wunsch 2004, 34).  
Here, a note on centralization is necessary.  In countries all over the world, periods of 
decentralization are followed by periods of centralization.  In Africa, Mamdani (1996, 291) has 
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called this the “seesaw of African politics.”  According to J. Tyler Dickovick (2012) 
decentralization and (re)centralization are so linked that they should be studied together as one 
larger process.  Most scholars agree that central governments “typically prefer not to decentralize 
power… they prefer to limit subnational actors and maximize their own power and discretion 
over resources” (6).  In Africa, following decolonization, leaders were able to create systems of 
centralized power within the newly independent states as the population rejected the rule that had 
been imposed by local chiefs under the decentralized colonial system.  However, this 
centralization of power would not hold.  We will see some of the reasons scholars posit that 
governments opt to decentralize power further on in this literature review.    
In the 1980s and 1990s, as African governments adopted Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) and undertook democratic transitions, they also increasingly implemented 
decentralization reforms.  As Richard Crook and James Manor (1998, 1-2) argue, this was, at 
least partially, a surprising development because attempts to decentralize during the immediate 
post-independence era “had been vitiated by distrust and interference from above.”  However, as 
proponents of decentralization point out, unlike previous decentralization efforts in which leaders 
designed reforms “to manage local populations,” and the subnational units of government 
created through decentralization “were expected to carry out orders passed down” from the 
central state, the reforms that gained traction in the late 1980s and 1990s “focused more on 
democratization, governance, pluralism, and rights” (Ribot and Oyono 2005, 205).  Though they 
acknowledge that recent efforts are partly “a continuation of past approaches,” Olowu and 
Wunsch (2004, 38-9) argue that the decentralization of the late 1980s and 1990s included “for 
the first time since the late colonial period the possibility of local institutions that are genuinely 
participatory and responsible to the local community.”   
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Decentralization reforms quickly became “the centerpiece of the modernizing-democratic 
discourse of developing world state elites and the international development community” (Heller 
2001, 135).  And, as development agencies and international donors became increasingly 
preoccupied with the potential for decentralization to improve governance and development 
outcomes, they seemed to forget that governments also pursue decentralization reforms for 
political reasons.  Within this context, governments themselves also began to deemphasize the 
politics of decentralization.  According to Ribot (2002, 7), with the most recent wave of 
decentralization reforms, emphasis “shifted from the political justifications – national stability, 
garnering popular support, ‘petty politicking’ and so forth – …to the developmental value of 
decentralization.”     
As a constituent colony of French West Africa, Mali experienced the same colonial 
system of administration discussed above that was implemented in colonies across the continent.   
After independence in 1960, the socialist government of Modibo Keita and, later, the military 
regime of Moussa Traoré reversed any progress that had been made towards devolution in the 
late colonial period as they sought to consolidate power in the central government.  In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Moussa Traoré’s government seemed to take small steps toward 
decentralization as he introduced development councils throughout the country to “provide local 
people with the opportunity to participate in the administration of the district.”  However, the 
government “proved reluctant to relinquish its prerogatives and change the system” so the 
councils, dominated by members of Traoré’s party, were given no funding with which to work. 
(Coulibaly and Hilhorst 2004, 3)  This remained an acceptable outcome to these reform efforts 
for Traoré’s government until the pro-democracy movement gained strength in Mali in 1990 and 
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forced Traoré to renew his calls for increased decentralization as a last effort to liberalize without 
introducing multiparty democracy.   
The decentralization reforms introduced by Alpha Oumar Konaré’s government 
following the democratic transition are an early example of decentralization reforms on the 
continent designed as devolution.  Decentralization in Mali began in earnest in January 1993 
when President Konaré created the Mission de Décentralisation (MD), the government agency 
tasked with designing and implementing decentralization reforms, and the National Assembly 
adopted the foundational law that defined the vision for decentralization in Mali.  According to 
law No. 93-008, elected councils would “freely administer” subnational governments to be 
created throughout the country (Article 5).  These collectivités territoriales include communes 
(i.e., urban and rural municipalities) at the local level and cercles (best translated as districts) and 
regions at intermediate levels.  The law broadly defines the “mission” of these new governments 
to promote local and regional economic, social, and cultural development (Article 3), and 
mandates that every transfer of responsibility from the central government to subnational 
governments that falls within this mission “must be accompanied by a concomitant transfer... of 
resources necessary to the normal exercise” of those responsibilities (Article 5).    
The relatively participatory process through which municipalities were created was an 
especially impressive innovation of the decentralization project in Mali.  The MD sought to 
engage communities in the design and implementation of decentralization from the early stages 
of the reform process and established Groupes régionals d’Étude et de Mobilisation (GREM) 
and Groupes locals d’Étude et de Mobilisation (GLEM) to communicate with Malians at the 
local and regional levels.  When it came time to divide the country into municipalities, the MD 
gave villages and fractions significant authority to form municipalities through a process called 
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decoupage, and only made the final decision of how villages or fractions should be combined 
into a municipality if community representatives could not reach an agreement themselves (SNV 
2004, 49). 1  In 1996, the National Assembly approved the creation of 682 new municipalities, in 
addition to the 19 urban municipalities that Mali had inherited from previous administrations.  
Two additional municipalities were created in 2002, and, today, the country is divided into 703 
municipalities, 49 districts, the special district of Bamako and eight regions.2   Mali held its first 
municipal elections in 1998 and 1999, and “represents one of the first and most successful 
countries in Africa to implement free multiparty elections at the local level” (Mauxion 2012, 29).  
Subsequently, municipal elections were held in 2004 and 2009, and, following the 2012 coup 
d’état, municipal governments remained the only directly elected governments in Mali.  
However, despite the success the government met with in the early stages of the reform 
process, recent reports lament the inability of the Konaré administration and the ATT 
administration that succeeded it to fully consolidate decentralization.  According to Cheibane 
Coulibaly, Tyler Dickovick, and James Thomson (2010, 49), 
in Mali’s democratic context, decentralization and local governance progressed in 
terms of decentralizing some formal authority in a relatively bottom-up process in 
the 1990s, but [the] consolidation of decentralized governance has lagged, 
especially in the areas of local autonomy and downward accountability.  The 
central state continues to exercise a degree of top-down authority, despite the fact 
that sub-national governments are now independently elected and have had public 
service responsibilities decentralized to them.  The fiscal autonomy of sub-
national governments is particularly limited.   
 
According to a recent report by the MATCL, the delayed transfer of responsibility and resources 
from central government ministries to subnational governments has been the “Achilles heel” of 
the decentralization process in the country (2011, 41).  Because the government has failed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Fractions are the administrative unit for nomadic communities established under the French colonial system that 
correspond with villages.  Because there is no direct English translation, I will use the word fraction throughout this 
thesis.   
2 See the appendix for maps of municipal and regional divisions in Mali. 
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redistribute financial resources to subnational governments as envisioned by decentralization 
reforms, and the majority of municipalities have little capacity to generate their own revenues, 
many municipalities have struggled to significantly improve public services provision.  
According to Susanna Wing and Bréhima Kassibo (2010, 20), the decentralization project in 
Mali has become “little more than legal texts with only very partial implementation.”  
As in Mali, the initial enthusiasm that greeted many decentralization efforts across the 
African continent in the early 1990s has since waned, and there has been a “frequent cry that 
decentralization has failed Africa” (Olowu and Wunsch 2004, 264).  Ribot and Oyono (2005, 
206) believe that the latest wave of decentralization reforms in Africa is “in fetters,” and has not 
delivered “promised enfranchisement and improvements.”  Reforms that were designed as 
devolution have instead led to deconcentration.  Governments have achieved some success in 
terms of the stated goals of improving democratic governance and stability, and “public services 
seem to have modestly improved in some cases,” but there is no clear evidence that 
decentralization has had a positive impact on development across Africa (Dickovick and Riedl 
2010, 71).  
As stated earlier, this is likely because governments pursue decentralization for a 
combination of developmental and political reasons, but scholarship surrounding these recent 
decentralization reforms tended to discount the political pressures that lead governments to 
decentralize.  More recently, as the decentralizations of the 1990s have come under increasing 
criticism, the focus has once more begun to shift as scholars again emphasize, and many 
development agencies have begun to acknowledge, that a government’s decision to decentralize 
is informed by a number of motivations, many of which may not be primarily concerned with 
strengthening local governance or improving democracy and development (Manor 1999; Ribot 
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2002; Oxhorn 2004; Dickovick and Riedl 2010).  According to Crook (2003, 78), “different 
governments have different political purposes and motives for introducing decentralization,” and 
“these intentions are embodied in the structure… of decentralization or, more subtly, are 
revealed in how the system functions” after decentralization is implemented.   
Many scholars have attempted to generalize the motives that push governments to 
decentralize across countries.  According to Dickovick and Reidl (2010, 10), a “government may 
choose to decentralize to build governing legitimacy and shore up electoral support as its power 
wanes.”  Governments may also promote decentralization to strengthen the larger regime, and 
many decentralization initiatives of the 1990s were part of the democratization agenda to 
strengthen newly established democratic regimes (9).  Decentralization has been explained  
as an outcome of pressure from economic crises; a means for central governments 
to shed fiscal and administrative burdens; a failure of central administration; an 
emulation of reforms in other developing countries; a result of populist political 
success; a result of donor pressures and conditions as part of structural adjustment 
and other programmes imposed from the outside; as a response to subnational 
splinter groups and pressure to appease and incorporate local elites; and as the 
consequence of particular relations between central and local authorities. (Ribot 
2002, 7) 
 
In Mali, it is clear, as many scholars argue, that decentralization reforms developed by 
the Konaré administration at least partly evolved as a direct result of democratization and should 
be considered as an attempt to consolidate democracy in the country (Olowu and Wunsch 2004, 
19; Wing and Kassibo 2010, 4).  The latest decentralization efforts have their origin in the 
National Conference and the 1992 Constitution that established the Third Republic as a 
multiparty democracy.  The civil society representatives who participated in the National 
Conference found that General Moussa Traoré’s government had been “inefficient, incompetent, 
and oblivious to the needs of the nation” and that “state intervention in rural areas had only 
reinforced central power” (Rawson 2000, 265; see also Ouedraogo 2003 and Wing 2010).  Thus, 
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the 1992 Constitution recognized “freely administered” subnational units of government to be 
created by later law, and the final report of the National Conference recommended that Mali 
pursue decentralization to “change the way state business was conducted across” the entire 
country (Rawson, 265).   
According to Robert Pringle (2006, 43), U.S. Ambassador to Mali from 1987 to 1990, 
“decentralization is correctly regarded as the heart of Mali’s democracy.”  However, as scholars 
like Dickovick (2011, 8) argue, “while many decentralizing processes occur alongside transitions 
from authoritarian rule, … democratization alone” does not lead to decentralization.  Taking a 
more measured view than his predecessor, David Rawson (2000, 265), U.S. Ambassador to Mali 
from 1996 to 1999, asserts that “the new political context” in Mali following the overthrow of 
Traoré necessitated decentralization reforms.  Specifically, decentralization was one way the 
Konaré administration sought to legitimize the new regime and break with the “predatory and 
authoritarian” neocolonial regimes of the First and Second Republics of Mali led by Modibo 
Keita (1960-1968) and Moussa Traoré (1968-1991), respectively (Kassibo 1997, 2).  
In the case of Mali, observers have also largely accepted the central tenet of Seely’s 
(2001) thesis that the Konaré administration committed to significant decentralization reforms to 
address the demands of Tuareg separatists who led Mali’s Second Tuareg Rebellion that 
persisted at varying intensities from 1990 to 1995/96 (see Idelman 2009; Wing and Kassibo 
2010; Coulibaly, Dickovick, and Thomson 2010).  Pringle (2006, 20) has criticized Seely’s 
thesis, arguing that “though it was successfully deployed to do so,” Malian decentralization 
reforms in the 1990s were not “invented to deal with the Tuareg problem” (my emphasis).  
However, most scholars agree that the drive for decentralization that originated at the National 
Conference was at least “reinforced by the Tuareg rebellion” (Ouedraogo 2003, 100).   
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According to Coulibaly, Dickovick, and Thomson (2010, 10), one of the political realities 
which has hindered the decentralization process in Mali is that the Malian “decision-making elite 
at the time of democratization” were not committed to the “full establishment of a highly 
decentralized state.”  In addition to these more “noble and pragmatic” motivations theorized 
above, they suggest that a “more venal” incentive for the Konaré administration may have been 
“to provide electoral outlets for [the] rank and file” of Konaré’s political party and ensure its 
place as the dominant political party in Mali (10-11).  They also posit that state elites might have 
viewed decentralization as a way “to expand opportunities for patronage and rent collection” by 
“extend[ing] formal governance down to the local level” (11).  Additionally, many Malians and 
actors in the international community share the opinion of observers who posit that the Konaré 
administration at least partly pushed decentralization to please international donors and take 
advantage of international support (see Félix 1996 and Kassibo 1997).  According to Ribot and 
Oyono (2005, 211), decentralization in Mali, as in many developing countries, has been “talked 
of, designed and even implemented as a kind of theatrical performance for donors.” 
This literature review seeks to define decentralization and contextualize Mali’s latest 
attempt at decentralization for the reader.   It defines some of the terms that the reader will see 
throughout the thesis and provides a brief history of decentralization efforts in independent Mali 
with a particular emphasis on the decentralization reforms adopted by the Konaré administration 
in the 1990s before introducing some of the government motivations for those reforms posited by 
multiple scholars.  The centrality of these reforms to the Konaré administration’s agenda cannot 
be understated, and I believe this thesis will contribute to a better understanding of the process of 
decentralization in Mali.      
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D. Methodology 
I used a combination of primary and secondary sources in my research.  I drew on Malian 
government documents and reports from donor governments, NGOs, and IGOs to understand the 
structure of decentralization and the status of those reforms in the country today.  To better 
understand the political context in Mali at the time the government adopted decentralization 
reforms, I conducted a content analysis of Malian newspapers from the early to mid-1990s.  My 
analysis was limited to newspapers available at Indiana University and other US institutions, but 
I was able to access the state-owned daily, L’Essor Quotidien and the state-owned weekly, 
L’Essor Hebdomadaire, from 1990 to 1994 as well as two private-owned newspapers, Le 
Républicain from 1993 to 1995 and Les Échos from 1990 to 1994.   
Prior to the fall of the Traoré government, L’Essor was controlled by the unitary party, 
the Union démocratique du Peuple malien (UDPM), and, though marketed as la voix du peuple, 
served as a mouthpiece of the government, largely reporting on government decisions, official 
speeches, party meetings, and trips made by party officials.  Though L’Essor remained a 
decidedly pro-government publication following Mali’s democratic transition, the newspaper 
was granted more independence and also began to run political commentary in addition to 
publishing the full text of official speeches made by President Konaré and covering official visits 
and meetings.  Today, L’Essor remains the most widely read newspaper in Mali.  It is the only 
newspaper with national coverage and is distributed in all major cities (IREX 2012, 247). 
Neither Les Échos nor Le Républicain can be categorized as objective publications, and 
each had its own decided political perspective.  Originally founded in 1989 as a biweekly 
newspaper, Les Échos transitioned to a daily publication in 1991.  The paper is a publication of 
Jamana, a publishing cooperative founded in 1983 by Alpha Oumar Konaré, and was a strong 
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advocate of multiparty democracy prior to the fall of the Traoré dictatorship.  Today, Les Échos 
remains one of the major newspapers published in Bamako.  Though the publication included 
opinion pieces and political commentary critical of the Konaré administration following the 
implementation of multiparty democracy, it was sympathetic toward the government, Konaré, 
and his political party, ADEMA.3  Malian politician, Tiébilé Dramé, a member of the opposition 
party, the Congrés national d’Initiative démocratique (CNID) in the early 1990s, founded Le 
Républicain in 1992.  According to its own research at the time, the newspaper was the most 
widely sold weekly newspaper in Mali and was perceived as having a decided slant toward the 
opposition (Le Républican 11 August 1993).  It remains a widely read newspaper in Bamako 
today.  All of these newspapers are published in French, and, though the accounts from the 
newspapers are largely limited to elite perspectives from the capital, Bamako, these are the 
perspectives that informed government decisions and reflected government attitudes in the early 
1990s.  As Claude Fay (1995, 19) has written, in the 1990s, the national political “scene” in Mali 
could be understood as the scène politique urbaine. 
Finally, it must be noted that my experience as a Peace Corps volunteer in a rural 
municipality in Mali from 2005 to 2007 and continued informal contact with friends in that 
municipality, its regional capital, Sikasso, and Bamako has also informed by understanding of 
decentralization in Mali.  In fact, my experience as a Peace Corps volunteer initially motivated 
me to study decentralization in the country.  That said, I have not visited Mali since a short trip 
over the summer of 2011, and my research is limited by a lack of formal fieldwork and direct 
interviews with past and present Malian government officials that would have proven invaluable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The full name of Konaré’s political party is the Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali – Parti Pan-Africain pour la 
Liberté, la Solidarité et la Justice (Adema-PASJ).  I will refer to the party as ADEMA, as it is know in Mali, 
throughout this thesis. 
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to my research.  While I am acutely aware of these limitations, I believe this thesis provides a 
thoughtful political analysis of decentralization in Mali.   
 
D. Organization  
 Chapter two provides an overview of state building and decentralization efforts under the 
French colonial administration while chapter three takes a closer look at decentralization efforts 
under Mali’s first and second presidents, Modibo Keita and Moussa Traoré.  The fourth chapter 
begins with a discussion of Mali’s democratic transition in 1991 before it turns to an in-depth 
analysis of why the Konaré administration embarked on significant decentralization reforms in 
the 1990s.  I investigate the external and internal pressures that led the Konaré administration to 
institute decentralization reforms and consider the impact of those motivations on 
decentralization in Mali.  Chapter five concludes the thesis.  It discusses policy lessons and 
offers recommendations to donors that seek to promote decentralization in Mali and other 
developing countries.  It also briefly considers IBK’s efforts to promote decentralization as a 
way to strengthen his government and address the Tuareg problem.  
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CHAPTER 2 
State Formation and Decentralization under the French Colonial Administration 
 
This chapter explores the creation of the Malian state beginning with the establishment of 
the French colonial administration in West Africa.  It also considers efforts made by the French 
colonial authority to decentralize power following both world wars as a way to maintain control 
of their West African colonies.   It is necessary to explore the system of administration 
established by the French and the colonial power’s attempts at decentralization to understand the 
state established in Mali after independence and the half-hearted decentralization efforts pursued 
by presidents Modibo Keita and Moussa Traoré.  As Bréhima Kassibo (1997, 7) has written, both 
of these presidents applied the colonial model of administration in independent Mali “without a 
break” from 1960 to 1991.  Additionally, though officials within President Alpha Oumar 
Konaré’s administration (1992-2002) and other advocates of decentralization have tried to claim 
that the recent decentralization efforts in Mali are deeply rooted in an “institutional heritage 
handed down from the major state institutions constructed” by the pre-colonial empires that 
existed in the region (SNV 2004, 15), the state structures that exist in Mali today were developed 
from those inherited from the French colonial administration.  As Mahmood Mamdani (1996, 4) 
has argued, the institutions developed by the colonial powers in Africa, “remain more or less 
intact” today.     
 
A. Establishing the Colonial Administration 
  French Soudan, the French colonial territory that became the Republic of Mali in 1960, 
was one of eight colonies, or territories, that made up France’s largest colonial holding in Africa, 
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Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF). Originally administered as part of the colony of Senegal, 
the French recognized Soudan as a colony under a military governor in 1892.  A year later, after 
the final defeat of Amadou Tall, by then, the de facto leader of the Tukulor Empire, the French 
replaced the colony’s military administration with a civilian one (Imperato and Imperato 2008, 
xxix).4   
Between 1895 and 1904, France worked to establish the AOF as a super colony with a 
civilian administration through a series of decrees that federated its landlocked West African 
colonies like Soudan with its more prosperous coastal colonies like Senegal and Guinea (Chafer 
2002, 27).  Paris had incurred massive expense to expand its control in West Africa and, 
reluctant to provide continued financing for the colonies, viewed this federation as the only way 
to ensure the self-sufficiency of it’s West African holdings (McNamara 1989, 82).  The French 
created the Government General in 1895 “as the overarching authority in West Africa” and 
located it in Dakar to “decentralize decision-making from the métropole” because “only a senior 
official on the spot would be sufficiently aware of events and conditions in the colony to make 
informed policy choices” (Conklin 1997a, 23).   
Though the Governor General reported to the Minister of Colonies in Paris, he had 
significant autonomy to tax the colonies and create policies for the entire federation of territories.  
According to Mamdani (1996, 56), “so long as a colony could balance its books, its 
administration remained a highly decentralized affair.”  Thus, the raison d’être of the new 
administration in the AOF quickly became the “rational economic utilization of the [federated] 
colony’s resources” (Conklin 1997a, 39).  This would ensure that French West Africa became 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Amadou Tall was the eldest son of El Hadj Umar Tall, the founder of the Tukulor Empire that encompassed large 
areas of modern-day Mali, Senegal, and Guinea.  Upon his father’s death in 1864, Amadou became leader of the 
Segou Tukulor Empire centered on the modern-day Malian city of Segou.  He tried to consolidate the constituent 
parts of the Empire that had been inherited by his brothers and cousin, but failed.  However, as the French conquered 
the Empire, Tukulor leaders began to defer to Amadou before he was forced to abandon the Empire entirely.       
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self-sufficient and that the colonies’ natural resources and tax revenues would be available to the 
métropole.  According to Aurelien Mauxion (2012, 49), during the early decades of colonial rule 
in French Soudan, “administrators were primarily concerned with keeping the colony at peace, 
monitoring activities of political and religious leaders, and registering the population in order to 
efficiently collect taxes.”  
To do this, the French civilian administration adopted a system of territorial 
administration originally organized by the military as it conquered the AOF territories.  Outside 
of the Four Communes of Senegal – Saint Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, and Dakar – where France 
had a long history of contact and sought to implement assimilationist policies considered to be 
“the logical outcome of the French mission civilisatrice,” the military had adopted a protectorate 
system of administration (Lewis 1962, 129).  While the Four Communes enjoyed “the same 
municipal prerogatives and rights as French communes,” and its residents who were recognized 
as citizens gained representation in the French National Assembly by the mid-19th century (Diouf 
1998, 673), the newly conquered inland territories were subjected to “an essentially paternalistic 
administrative regime… in which the colonial power ruled through African intermediaries” 
(Chafer 2002, 30).   
The military initially established protectorates over the smaller African states they 
encountered through treaties, and grouped the territories they conquered into colonies.  The 
colonies were divided into cercles administered by a French military officer as commandant de 
cercle.  Cercles were further subdivided into provinces, cantons, and villages administered by 
provincial, canton, and village chiefs.  Initially, the military practiced indirect rule through this 
protectorate system, and, seeking to respect the “comparable divisions in the precolonial political 
order” as much as was possible within the “hierarchy of French administrative units,” legitimate 
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rulers were granted autonomy as provincial, canton, and village chiefs as long as they collected 
taxes and recruited labor for the French (Conklin 1997a, 111).  
Though this protectorate system “offered a pragmatic solution to the problem of 
governing at minimal cost,” the military was forced to establish a more centralized 
administration in some parts of the AOF.  In Western Sudan, the French abandoned the 
protectorate system as they slowly conquered the large pre-colonial states established by El Hadj 
Umar Tall and Samori Touré in Western Soudan because they would not tolerate the continued 
rule of these powerful adversaries after their defeat (Conklin 1997a, 111).  Consequently, the 
French implemented a more “direct” system of administration in these areas, removing provinces 
from the administrative structure and dividing all cercles into cantons of approximately equal 
size (112).  The French gave little consideration to pre-colonial political units as they created the 
cantons and appointed canton chiefs who were loyal to the French rather than legitimate in the 
eyes of the population.   
As the civilian colonial administration established itself throughout the AOF, it adopted 
this system of “direct” administration.  Even in territories like Dahomey and Guinea, where 
protectorates were the norm, newly appointed civilian governors independently began to 
implement “direct” administrations.  From 1902 to 1907, under the leadership of Governor 
General Ernest Roume, what was left of the protectorate system was further dismantled as the 
French divided all pre-colonial states that had been constituted as protectorates into  “cantons of 
uniform size” (Conklin 1997a, 113).  According to Mamdani (1996, 83), though it was not 
entirely successful, “the key object of French policy” became “to flatten all mediation between 
the village and [the colonial administration] to one, the village chief” as a way to consolidate 
French rule over its subjects. 
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Subsequently, Governor General William Ponty, worked to further secure “exclusive 
policy-making powers” within his office and limit the role of African chiefs in the territorial 
administration (Conklin 1997a, 109-10).  Thus prior to World War I, the governor general came 
to hold “truly viceregal powers,” at the “apex of a highly centralized administrative pyramid,” in 
which the lieutenant governors of the various territories only had “limited autonomous 
administrative authority,” and became, in effect, “the principal resident subordinates of the 
governor general” (McNamara 1989, 30-31).  The governor general appointed the French 
commandants who served at the cercle level of administration and were accountable to the 
lieutenant governors of the territories.  In turn, these cercle commanders carefully controlled the 
canton chiefs who presided over a system of forced labor and conscription that village chiefs 
helped to administer at the local level.  French commandants were able to ensure that canton 
chiefs complied with the system of taxation and forced labor and were able delegitimize some of 
the customary authority held by chiefs by the brutal implementation of the indigénat, “the regime 
of administrative sanctions” that commandants could apply to colonial subjects to “inflict swift 
punishments for any challenge, real or perceived, to their personal authority and that of the 
colonial state” (Mann 2009, 334).  
As has already been stated, the French sought to efficiently extend economic and political 
control in the AOF through this hierarchical system that “deliberately sapped the traditional 
powers of the chiefs in the interest of uniformity of administration” (Crowder 1964, 201).  The 
establishment of this territorial administration was also either driven by, or at least justified by, 
the French civilizing mission, “the official ideology of the Third Republic” that had helped to 
justify the acquisition of a vast African empire (Conklin 1997a, 11).  Though this “direct” 
administration did not reflect the assimilationist policies implemented in the Four Communes, 
	   24	  
colonial administrators believed that it freed their AOF subjects from the “feudal potentates” 
who ruled the pre-colonial empires (Ponty quoted in Conklin, 110).  As David Rawson (2000, 
269) has written, “the centralizing ethos of French colonial administration coupled Cartesian 
logic with republican rigor, Roman law, and French civilizing mission,” and “the French notion 
of effective administration and social service delivery paralleled its top-down notions of political 
control and influence.”   
This “direct” administration initially adopted by the French civilian administration in the 
AOF is often described in the literature as highly centralized.  This is an accurate assessment in 
that it “provided	  for	  a	  system	  of	  hierarchical	  rule	  from	  the	  central	  government	  down	  to	  the	  villages” (Olowu and Wunsch 2004, 31), and each level of administration in the colonies was 
ultimately accountable to the central power, the Government General in Dakar, which was, in 
turn, accountable to the colonial ministry in Paris.  The canton chiefs at the lowest levels of the 
administration had almost no political autonomy, and the central authority sought to manage 
rural affairs and strengthen central roles by delegitimizing customary authorities and any pre-
existing local governments (Ribot 2002, 5).  Yet, it must also be noted that this system of 
“direct” administration established by the French is still best classified as a deconcentrated 
system of administration, albeit a weak, highly centralized, authoritarian one.  With echoes of 
Mamdani (1996), Heller (2001, 132) has written that the history of colonial rule is “largely a 
history of decentralized authority,” in which “local despots” were tasked by the administration 
with maintaining order and extracting revenues.  As we will see, the French further decentralized 
power to “local despots” after World War I and World War II in an attempt to preserve French 
control over the AOF. 
 
	   25	  
B. World War I 
 The weaknesses of the colonial administration in the AOF became apparent during World 
War I as African subjects actively resisted recruitment into the French army and évolués began to 
demand political equality for all Africans in French West Africa.  This led successive governors 
general to question the established policy of “divest[ing] chiefs of their authority” to “maintain 
all power in their own hands” (Conklin 1997a, 174), and the colonial administration adopted a 
“new” theory of association, similar to British indirect rule and the protectorate system originally 
adopted by the French military in the AOF territories.  Unlike previous policies, association 
“encouraged the retention of native institutions and implied a large degree of administrative 
autonomy” for canton chiefs (Betts 1960, 122).  Today, many of the policies that emerged from 
association would be classified as deconcentration.  Mamdani (1996) refers to the policies 
established during this era as “decentralized despotism.”   
In 1917, territorial governors in AOF were directed to reappoint customary chiefs as 
canton and village chiefs, and Governor General Joost van Vollenhoven ordered the governors to 
“rigorously …  delegat[e] decision-making power and bring the administration as close as 
possible to the administered population” because it was “the only way” to “reconcile the interests 
of the dominant power with those of the local people” (quoted in SNV 2004, 15; Wing and 
Kassibo 2010, 2; and Diawara 2011, 436).  Additionally, two years later, in 1919, the French 
established conseils des notables indigènes at the cercle level of the administration that were 
made up of African members appointed by the governor of the colony and chaired by the 
commandant de cercle (Chafer 2002, 30).  At the local level, a 1920 decree envisioned the 
eventual “transformation of all African communities into communes with municipal 
responsibilities” (Conklin 1997a, 192).  As part of this reform, a few urban areas, including 
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Bamako and Kayes in Soudan, were accorded the status of communes mixtes, which meant they 
were governed by a council of Europeans and educated Africans and led by a mayor appointed 
by the colonial administration.  In rural areas, the administration created village councils with the 
intention that those villages would ultimately become native communes, run by an administrator-
mayor in consultation with a council of elders.   
According to a recent study of decentralization in Mali, the French implemented these 
policies because they recognized “that, due to geographical constraints and specific cultural 
features, decentralization was a management model,” which would “produce better results” in 
the AOF (SNV 2004, 15).  Rawson (2000, 269) also highlights the practical reasons the French 
introduced these reforms and notes that attempts by the administration to “impose uniform 
codes” throughout the territory had “[given] way to local practices” because a scarcity of human 
and monetary resources severely limited the ability of the colonial administration to adequately 
administer large territories like French Soudan.  Additionally, not unlike modern day advocates 
of decentralization, idealists at the time argued that the policies that grew out of association 
“would lead to improved local wellbeing,” while the French government justified the reforms “in 
terms of local self-determination” (Oyono and Ribot 2004, 206).  
However, as Mamdani (1996, 16-17) has rightfully pointed out, “the organization and 
reorganization” of the state during the colonial period was primarily “a response to a central and 
overriding dilemma” of colonization, namely “how a tiny and foreign minority [could] rule over 
an indigenous majority.”  Association, which he equates with British indirect rule, was nothing 
but “a mediated – decentralized – despotism” designed to control the large subject population of 
the AOF.  As Conklin argues, the French colonial administration’s emphasis on association 
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following World War I and its efforts to transfer greater power to customary authorities and local 
councils was 
motivated more by a desire to contain the évolués… and to reestablish ‘discipline’ 
among their subjects in general, than by any intrinsic interest in either African 
civilizations or democracy… Dakar ‘reinvented’ an ostensibly African form of 
democracy as part of its bid to reassert republican hegemony in the federation 
(1997a, 175). 
 
During the War, the Government General in Dakar had become increasingly alarmed by 
the demands of the growing number of educated African évolués, the majority of whom lived in 
the Four Communes and other urban areas, that they be recognized as French citizens and share 
power with the French.  Blaise Diagne, the first black député to represent the Four Communes in 
the French National Assembly, had made the question of French citizenship the central issue of 
the 1914 elections, and, once elected, he successfully forced the National Assembly to grant 
French citizenship to African residents of Saint Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, and Dakar by urging 
African originaires of the Four Communes not to enlist in the French army unless their 
citizenship was ensured (Lambert 1993, 244-45).   
The passage of the 1915 law that granted French citizenship to the originaires of the Four 
Communes worried colonial administrators, but more alarming was the reputation Diagne gained 
by the end of the war “as spokesman for the rights of all Africans [in the AOF] against a 
demanding and authoritarian colonial administration” (Conklin 1997a, 156).  Diagne had begun 
to demand the enfranchisement of African subjects throughout the AOF, something the French 
viewed as “nothing less than the urban évolués bid for the peasants’ allegiance and an attempt to 
discredit the collaborating chiefs in the eyes of the rural masses” (157).  Diagne’s efforts were 
especially troubling because there had been significant resistance to the recruitment of tirailleurs 
for the French army from the rural African population without his interference.  African subjects 
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passively resisted recruitment, and there were sporadic revolts against the administration 
throughout the war.  While these revolts were directly triggered by the recruitment of tirailleurs, 
they were also a response to “the overly zealous application” of the French direct administration 
that had removed customary chiefs from power and stripped others of their authority (148).   
The policies introduced through the aegis of association following the war directly 
addressed these challenges to French rule.  French administrators sought to counterbalance the 
demands of the évolués and maintain their control by returning some authority to customary 
leaders in rural areas and creating a handful of communes governed by municipal councils in 
urban areas beyond the Four Communes.  Many of these moves towards decentralization were 
never fully implemented.  After 1920, no additional communes were created until after World 
War II, cercle councils only ever held consultative authority in relation to the colonial 
administrators, and many of the village councils that should have been created to support, or, 
perhaps, check canton and village chiefs never materialized.   
However, there was no need to fully implement these reforms and ensure a voice for 
Africans in their governance once it was clear the reforms had checked Diagne’s demands for 
political equality for all Africans in the AOF.  Évolués were somewhat appeased with the seats 
they gained on municipal and cercle councils, and the customary chiefs the French appointed as 
canton chiefs, who “gained real power and wealth as French intermediaries” at the expense of 
local populations, did not revolt against the French administration again after 1918 (Conklin 
1997b, 75).  The interwar years were by no means untroubled, and the colonies, like the rest of 
the world, were greatly impacted by the global depression, but the small steps the colonial 
administration took toward decentralization following World War I allowed France to maintain 
control throughout its West African territories.  These reforms ensured the collaboration of rural 
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chiefs and, to a certain extent, the urban évolués, who gained some authority through municipal 
councils.  As Mamdani has argued, association  
was never just a commonsense, pragmatic, and cost-efficient administrative 
strategy that utilized local personnel to fill its lowest tiers.  Its point was to create 
a dependent but autonomous system of rule, one that combined accountability to 
superiors with flexible response to the subject population, a capacity to implement 
central directives with one to absorb local shocks. (1996, 60) 
 
 
 
C. World War II 
 World War II irrevocably changed the relationship between France and its African 
colonies.  International attitudes towards colonization had changed, the French government was 
forced to acknowledge the significant role Africans had played in the War, and French-educated 
évolués increasingly began to push for equal rights within a growing nationalist movement.  
Mamdani (1996, 102-103) argues that the potential of association “was exhausted in the 
aftermath of the Second World War” because “nationalist movements successfully linked urban 
protest against racial exclusion in civil society to rural movements against” the broad powers of 
local chiefs.   
Unwilling to let their West African colonies go, the post-WWII French government made 
efforts to decentralize a degree of power to African populations through municipal governments 
and territorial councils within the colonial administration.  Olowu and Wunsch (2004, 32), 
emphasize that reforms introduced by the British and French across Africa after World War II 
came close to the ideal-type decentralization, devolution, in that they at least established an 
“outline of a system of local government,” the vitality of which is demonstrated by “the base it 
provided for many of the leaders who rose to challenge the colonial system.”  Nelson Kasfir 
(1993, 24-5) agrees, noting that “for different reasons some colonial administrators and 
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nationalists fighting for independence jointly supported the introduction of a Western model of 
local government” in the late colonial period.   
Though French efforts fell short of those of the British, the French did create additional 
urban communes across the AOF prior to independence.  In Soudan, the French established 
Mopti and Segou as mixed communes in 1953 and established Sikasso as a mixed commune the 
following year.  In 1955, the French granted the municipalities of Bamako, Mopti, Kayes, and 
Segou status as full communes.  Under this designation, these local governments were 
administered by elected councils that appointed a mayor and enjoyed the full range of authority 
accorded to municipalities in France (Kassibo 1997, 3).  In November 1956, municipal elections 
were held for the first time under a system of universal suffrage in the AOF, and, two years later, 
in 1958, the French designated the towns of Gao, Kati, Kita, Koulikoro, Koutiala, Nioro, San, 
and Timbuktu as mixed communes while Sikasso was promoted to full commune status in 1959 
(SNV 2004, 15-16).  
Most studies of decentralization in Mali are primarily concerned with the creation and 
functioning of local governments and, thus, focus on the creation of these urban municipalities 
under the French Fourth Republic.  However, it is also important to note that the 1946 
constitution that established the Fourth French Republic as the Union Française also called for 
the significant transfer of authority to territorial assemblies in each of the colonies of the AOF.  
Though these territorial assemblies became national assemblies at independence, at the time they 
represented nascent subnational governments within the larger French Empire.  The more liberal 
first draft of the constitution of the French Fourth Republic would have granted territorial 
assemblies, elected under a system of universal suffrage, considerable authority to administer the 
territories and would have replaced the governor general with a resident under-secretary of state 
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(Chafer 2002, 65).  However, an October 1946 law ultimately directed that territorial assemblies 
be elected by a double electoral college to ensure European representation, and only gave these 
bodies consultative power to the lieutenant governor of the territory, in effect, preserving the 
power of colonial administrators in the AOF (66).   
The creation of these territorial assemblies and the eventual establishment of additional 
municipalities throughout the AOF flowed from the “reformist intentions” of the new French 
government established at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference (Chafer 2002, 50).  According to 
Mauxion (2012, 50), at the conference, “Charles de Gaulle promised Africans a greater voice in 
French and colonial post-war politics” because African “participation in the war effort, which 
coincided with the progressive urbanization of the colonies and the increasing importance of a 
French-educated African elite” obligated “France to significantly reconsider its position in 
Africa.”  However, the participants at the Brazzaville Conference – the governors general of 
AOF and French Equatorial Africa, lieutenant governors, cercle commanders, and other 
administration officials – also agreed that, though changes needed to be made to the colonial 
regime, the “overriding priority for France was to retain its colonial empire” (Chafer, 56).  
Reviving the French assimilationist ideal that the colonies would ultimately become a part of 
France, the final resolution of the Conference stated that, 
the aims of the work of colonization which France is pursuing in her colonies 
exclude any idea of autonomy and any possibility of development outside the 
French empire bloc; [and] the attainment of self-government in the colonies even 
in the most distant future must be excluded (quoted in Lewis 1962, 129).      
 
Thus, despite initial attempts to restructure the relationship between the métropole and 
French African colonies immediately following the War and decentralize a degree of power to 
local and territorial councils, the desire to maintain the French empire, made change slow to 
materialize.  The governor general in Dakar and the lieutenant governors in each of the territories 
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continued to dominate the colonial administration and control the budget-making process in the 
AOF.  And,   
because the political activities of African deputies were centered on Paris, this 
militated against achieving the objective De Gaulle had set at Brazzaville of 
guiding colonial populations towards managing their own affairs (Chafer 2002, 
153).   
 
However, while French administrators and députés were trying to slow the introduction 
of reforms that would devolve power to local governments and territorial assemblies, it quickly 
became clear that post-war France would not be able to finance the assimilationist reforms, like 
equal citizenship rights, pay, and benefits, that might hold the French Empire together.  The 
African representatives in the National Assembly increasingly lost hope in assimilation, and, as 
their disillusionment grew, began to “attach increasing importance to political autonomy” 
(Chafer 2002, 154).  Although French representatives succeeded in delaying its passage until 
1955, African representatives in the National Assembly introduced the municipal reforms that 
would eventually create additional communes throughout the AOF in 1951 (144).  And, within 
the AOF, more radical political parties and civil society groups increasingly called for 
independence, especially as they observed the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the start of the 
Algerian revolution in 1954 (Chafer 2002, 154).  
With their control slipping away, the French finally overcame years of inertia when the 
National Assembly passed the Loi Cadre in 1956.  Though this package of reforms ultimately led 
to the independence of the AOF territories, it was designed to devolve a significant degree of 
power to territorial assemblies as a last effort to keep the AOF “firmly in the French sphere of 
influence” (Chafer 2002, 186).  According to McNamara (1989, 33), it reversed the “highly 
centralized federal system” of colonial administration in the AOF.  Territorial assemblies became 
elected by universal suffrage and governors transferred much of their authority for the day-to-
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day management of the territories to them.  Chafer (2002, 186) notes that the reforms ensured 
that the French would maintain control of monetary policy, higher education, language policy, 
foreign affairs, and defense. However, as McNamara (71) asserts, under the Loi Cadre, for the 
first time, the colonial administration became responsible to members of the territorial 
assemblies elected by the population.   
Whichever the case, these reforms did not remain in place for long.  Approximately a 
year after the reforms came into full effect in the AOF, a coup attempt in Algiers in May 1958, 
led to the promulgation of a new constitution establishing the French Fifth Republic.  A 
referendum was held on the constitution, and French colonies were given the choice of 
establishing themselves “as internally-autonomous republics within the [French] Community” or 
becoming independent and losing French assistance (Lewis 1962, 130).  Initially, only Guinea 
opted to leave the French Community and lose all French support.  The remaining AOF colonies 
chose to maintain their connections to France, but, by 1960 each of the AOF colonies had chosen 
to become independent states.     
 
D. Conclusion  
The two waves of decentralization during the colonial period were initiated by the French 
following both world wars as attempts to maintain control within a volatile political context. 
During the first wave of decentralization, the French worked to quiet the demands of the French 
evolués for the political equality of Africans in the AOF and ensure the allegiance of chiefs 
within the colonial administration by strengthening the deconcentrated system of administration.  
The decentralization reforms enacted by the French in the late colonial period went further than 
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these initial reforms and came closer to devolution, but they were far from perfect and slow to 
materialize.   
The French were hesitant to grant increased autonomy to local and territorial 
governments lest it lead to the independence of AOF colonies.  When the National Assembly 
finally granted a significant degree of authority to the territorial assemblies through the Loi-
Cadre it was “more of a question of government facing up to the inevitable than skillful planning 
for the future” (Chafer 2002, 186).  That said the French did grant significant autonomy to 
subnational governments during the final years of its control, and the territorial assemblies and 
some of the local councils established by the French after World War II provided the 
“institutional grounds for the development of political debate and activities” across the AOF 
territories prior to decolonization (Mauxion 2012, 50).  According to Rawson (2000, 269), in the 
1990s, “many local authorities” viewed the decentralization reforms introduced by Alpha Oumar 
Konaré’s administration “as a process of recapturing the authority and responsibility their 
predecessors exercised” during the late colonial period.   
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CHAPTER 3 
Decentralization in the Post-Independence Era, 1960-1991 
 
Ironically, instead of building on the decentralization reforms that emerged in the late 
colonial period, post-independence leaders across West Africa moved to centralize power within 
authoritarian regimes.  In Mali, “the three first decades of postcolonial rule” from 1960 to 1991 
were “characterized by highly centralized and top-down administrative systems” (Mauxion 2012, 
48).  Initially, newly independent governments across Africa accepted the decentralization that, 
though imperfect, had been implemented by the colonial powers in the 1950s, but they soon 
moved to shut down the political space that had been opened up during the late colonial period 
through decentralization reforms (Mawhood 1993, 7).   
A number of factors led the leaders of newly independent states in Africa to begin to 
reverse course.  For one, many of these leaders “believed the only way to demonstrate the reality 
of political independence was through rapid economic development,” best achieved through 
central state planning, to which autonomous local authorities would be “irritants at best, if not 
obstacles” (Olowu and Wunsch 2004, 33).  Many leaders also supposed centralization as 
necessary to ensure the stability and unity of their multiethnic countries.  Additionally, it must be 
remembered that though decentralization became a popular policy in the late colonial period, the 
“colonial state that African nationalists sought to control was not modeled on Western 
‘universal,’ democratic and liberal values, but was a particularistic creation of European 
imperialism” (Chafer 2002, 233).  As Kasfir has made clear, 
the political culture bequeathed by colonialism contained notions that 
authoritarianism was an appropriate mode of rule and that political activity was 
merely a disguised form of self-interest, subversive of the public welfare.  Since 
decentralized government rests on the premises of democratic expression of local 
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interests and the existence of alternative governments, which are likely to express 
different views on policy from time to time, clearly, much of the colonial legacy 
was highly dissonant with the idea of decentralization. (1993, 33) 
 
 
 
A. The First Republic  
After breaking from the short-lived Mali Federation through which a united Senegal and 
Mali gained independence from France in June 1960, Modibo Keita and the Malian political elite 
founded the First Republic of Mali in September.  The 1960 constitution created the independent 
Malian republic as an “indivisible, democratic, secular, and social” state (Article 1) and 
established a system of government under which the National Assembly, the successor of the 
colonial territorial assembly, whose members would be elected by universal suffrage through 
multiparty elections, appointed the President.  Notably, the constitution also recognized 
collectivités territoriales, or subnational governments – regions, districts, fractions, 
municipalities, and villages – that would be “free to govern themselves by elected councils” 
(Article 41).  However, President Modibo Keita and leaders of his party, the Union Soudanaise-
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-RDA), soon abandoned the “democratic ambitions” 
of this first constitution “for the de facto imposition of US-RDA as [the] single-party,” and 
committed themselves to the development of Mali along socialist lines (Mauxion 2012, 52).  
This decision had implications for the subnational governments envisioned by the 
constitution.  Though Keita and US-RDA leaders espoused an “ideological commitment” to the 
devolution of power to local governments recognized by the constitution, their commitment was 
“balanced against the larger and more centralized ‘interests of the Republic’” (Rawson 2000, 
270).  As Mamadou Diawara (2011, 437) has written, the national motto adopted by the new 
Republic of Mali – “one people, one goal, one faith” – just did “not anticipate a space for” 
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significant decentralization in the country.  A 1966 law recognized all thirteen urban 
municipalities inherited from the colonial administration as full communes, and elections were 
held in these municipalities in June 1966, but the government never created additional 
municipalities or allowed villages and fractions to administer themselves through elected 
councils as envisioned by the constitution (Kassibo 1997, 3).  Additionally, according to John 
Hazard (1969, 9), the Minister of the Interior had to approve all decisions made by popularly 
elected municipal councils, while the larger Council of Ministers approved all municipal 
budgets.   
As Keita and his allies realized that the development of the largely rural country would 
depend on the success of the socialist revolution in rural Mali, US-RDA leaders worked to 
“radically transform” villages and fractions by establishing party and state structures down to the 
local level that were controlled by the center (Hopkins 1969, 457).  Under the principle of 
democratic centralism, the party structures that the US-RDA established at the village level were 
to provide a forum for Malians to express their needs and expectations; however, they were 
ultimately subject to decisions made by the “highest executive organ of the party,” the Bureau 
Politique National (BPN), led by Keita (Martin 1976, 30).  In addition to these party structures, 
Malian leaders created “a highly centralized and top-down state apparatus” to execute “their 
economic and political agenda” throughout the country (Mauxion 2012, 53).   
The State operated through deconcentrated administrative units of the central 
government, not dissimilar from those established by the French colonial administration.  Just 
prior to independence, in 1958, the US-RDA-controlled territorial assembly had removed 
cantons from the administrative structure of Soudan because the majority of canton chiefs, 
members of the opposition party, the Parti Soudanais Progressiste (PSP), were viewed as 
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collaborationists who continued to support the colonial power (Kassibo 2007, 11).5  However, 
though this move was designed to signal a break with the French colonial administration, after 
independence, the Keita administration simply instituted arrondissements, administered by a chef 
d’arrondissement, loyal to the US-RDA, in their place.  As under the French administration, the 
arrondissements were grouped into cercles, which were in turn grouped into regions.  The chef 
d’arrondissement was appointed by the commandant de cercle who was appointed by the 
regional governor, selected by the central government and instructed to work closely with the 
regional party (Hazard 1969, 10).  As Mamdani has argued,  
Even if there was a change in the title of functionaries, from chiefs to cadres, 
there was little change in the nature of power.  If anything, the fist of colonial 
power that was the local state was tightened and strengthened… [as post-colonial 
states] centralized coercive authority in the name of development or revolution. 
(1996, 26) 
 
In Mali, though councils headed by a chief operated in each village, they had limited 
powers and “were little more than the people in the villages with whom the government could 
deal” (Hopkins 1969, 462).  As under the colonial administration, village and fraction councils 
and chiefs were largely relegated to the role of assisting the central administration with tax 
collection.  According to Abdoulaye Sall (1993, 3), under Keita, the “omnipotent and 
omniscient” agents of the central state – the regional governors, commandants de cercle, and 
chefs de arrondissement – controlled power at the local level.  For instance, when farmers 
passively resisted the implementation of a centrally-planned cooperative farming system by 
producing what they could eat and selling any surplus on the black market, the state set rigid 
production quotas for every village, and arrondissement and cercle officials were authorized to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Fily Dabo Sissoko, one of the founders of the PSP, was a canton chief before he was elected to National Assembly 
in 1945.  The PSP advocated for the gradual independence of Mali from France and sought to protect the influence 
of the canton chiefs during the final years of colonial rule.  The PSP dominated post-World War II elections in 
French Soudan until it lost to the US-RDA in 1956.        
	   39	  
subject village chiefs and farmers “to all kinds of humiliations,” if they failed to meet the 
centrally imposed quotas (Sy 2009, 55).  
As Mali struggled to cope with economic and political crises of the period, the Keita 
regime became progressively radicalized and increasingly sought to concentrate power within 
the central party.  In March 1967, US-RDA leaders split over the implementation of a monetary 
accord with France through which the French agreed to support the faltering Malian Franc and 
Mali agreed to devalue its currency and cut government expenditures.  After devaluing the 
Malian Franc by 50 percent, Keita moved to appease the radical faction of the party that opposed 
the monetary accord by dissolving the BPN of the US-RDA and creating the Comité National de 
Défense de la Révolution (CNDR) to oversee both the party and the government.  A few months 
later, in early 1968, Keita activated a Milice populaire “to uncover corruption and purify the 
party.”  However, this militia of young US-RDA radicals made quick work of alienating a large 
portion of Malian citizens as they “conducted searches of home and person at will, detained 
many on the least pretext, and engaged in torture.” (Imperato and Imperato 2008, lxxxix)  Not 
surprisingly, eight years after US-RDA party leaders established the First Republic of Mali, the 
overthrow of Keita’s regime by a group of army officers in late 1968 was met with broad popular 
support.     
    
B. From Military Dictatorship to the Single Party Rule of the Second Republic 
  Malians initially supported the arrest of Modibo Keita by then-Lieutenant Moussa Traoré 
and a group of military officers in November 1968, but the Comité Militaire de Libération 
Nationale (CMLN) that took control of the government only reinforced the highly centralized, 
authoritarian character of the state in post-colonial Mali.  In December, the CMLN issued a 
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decree that suspended the 1960 Constitution and replaced it with the Loi fondamentale.  This 
Fundamental Law authorized the fourteen-member CMLN to “define, guide, and control the 
general policy of the Republic” by decree, and they appointed Committee chairman Moussa 
Traoré as military head of state (Delaborde 1968, 628).  Though the law stated that Article 41 of 
the 1960 Constitution with its ideal of administrative autonomy for subnational governments 
would remain in effect, the CMLN moved to appoint all local posts, including the mayors and 
councils of urban municipalities that had previously been elected (Seely 2001, 509).  Traoré 
never tolerated challenges to his authority – political activity was banned, protests were quickly 
quashed, opposition leaders were arrested, and, when necessary, members of his own 
government were purged – but “throughout his tenure [Traoré] constantly resorted to pseudo-
democratic gestures, namely formal elections, as a justification for his rule” (Villalón and Idrissa 
2005, 52). 
The implementation of the largest of these “pseudo-democratic gestures” began in 1974 
when the CMLN drafted a new constitution to establish the Second Republic of Mali as a 
civilian, single-party state under the Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM).  
According to Traoré, the multiparty system introduced by the 1960 constitution had been a 
complete failure because, in practice, it only benefited the US-RDA.  Unlike Keita’s regime, 
Traoré argued, the new single-party system would permit the consideration of different opinions 
because Mali did not want a “totalitarian party, which admits no argument” (quoted in Bennett 
1975, 264).  The constitution passed by referendum in June 1974 and allowed the CMLN to rule 
for an additional five years before a civilian administration was introduced.   
In March 1979, Traoré was chosen as secretary general of the UDPM, he stood as the 
only presidential candidate in the June 19 elections, and won 99.89 percent of the vote with a 
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reported 94.3 percent of the electorate voting (Novick and Rundblad 1979, 28).  Traoré was thus 
able to “acquire a certain democratic legitimacy,” while the military continued to support his 
government and play a substantial role in the new civilian regime (Rondos 1979, 39).  This 
situation is exemplified by the government reshuffle following the elections, in which Traoré 
removed four army colonels, powerful former members of the CMLN, from his government and 
appointed a 15-member cabinet composed primarily of civilians, only to make the colonels 
members of UDPM’s Central Committee (Imperato and Imperato 2008, xxxviii).   
This new “civilian” dictatorship only made superficial efforts at decentralization that 
allowed the single party, with the support of the military, to “retain complete control over the 
management of public affairs from the national to local level” (Mauxion 2012, 55).   Unlike the 
1960 constitution, the constitution of the Second Republic did not include provisions for the 
principle of self-administration through subnational governments.  Instead, it stipulated that 
collectivités territoriales would be “created and administered by the law” (Seely 2001, 509).  
Thus, before the transition to civilian rule, in 1977, the CMLN-controlled government introduced 
administrative reforms to redraw the boundaries of arrondissements, cercles, and regions and 
establish local councils throughout Mali.  In 1981 and 1982, the UDPM-led government created 
these councils as development committees at the regional and cercle levels of administration.  
However, the committees only exercised consultative power vis-à-vis government-appointed 
bureaucrats, UDPM members dominated the committees, which were appointed by the central 
government, and the governors and commandants de cercle tightly controlled committee actions 
(Mauxion 2012, 59).  According to Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf (1998, 27), 
within this system “party cadres, as much as the local administration officials” were controlled 
by the central decision-making power and used as “a vehicle for decentralized plunder across the 
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country.”     
Again, the decentralization reforms introduced as the CMLN prepared to transfer power 
to the civilian administration are best described as deconcentration.  They were a way for Traoré 
to consolidate the political power of the new single party by expanding the reach of state and 
party structures.  The development committees created by the reforms never held any real power, 
and the Ministry of the Interior resisted giving them any influence over public policy.  For 
instance, despite continued promises made by Traoré and other top party members to create the 
Fonds de Développement Régional et Local (FDRL) to finance the initiatives of regional and 
local development committees, the central government never issued the legal texts that would 
have defined the functioning of the fund and used fund reserves to finance its own priorities 
(Félix 1996, 2). 
By 1990, the Traoré regime came under significant pressure to allow multiparty elections 
in Mali.  The international context had changed; the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989 and bilateral 
donors like France and the United States, the former of which had supported Traoré since he 
came to power in 1968, began to stress that they would no longer finance authoritarian regimes.  
On the African continent, in February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison in South 
Africa, and, closer to home, Benin introduced democratic reforms through a National Sovereign 
Conference.  Within Mali it seemed the population would no longer tolerate the corrupt, 
repressive, single-party regime through which Traoré and his cronies enriched themselves at the 
expense of ordinary Malians.   
According to Pascal James Imperato (1991), Traoré’s dictatorship had been able to 
survive the devastating economic crisis that gripped Mali during the 1980s because it held 
pseudo-democratic elections while maintaining a special place for the military in its regime.  
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Additionally, with significant assistance from donors, Traoré was able “to support a large 
bureaucracy of close to 50,000 employees” (27).  With the introduction of SAPs, however, 
Traoré was forced to work to eliminate unprofitable national companies that had originated with 
Keita’s socialist republic and “stem the flow of new entrants into the civil service.”  
Theoretically, the private sector should have been able to absorb former government employees, 
but, in the late 1980s, socio-economic conditions only deteriorated, and groups like students, 
merchants, and workers reacted by voicing their displeasure with the inability of the government 
to grow the economy and create employment, not to mention its failure to provide basic social 
services.     
In June 1990, the national context worsened further as a group of “barely armed rebels” 
from the Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad (MPLA) attacked the town of 
Menaka, in the region of Gao, near the Niger border, instigating what is known in Mali as the 
Second Tuareg Rebellion (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 3).6  The Tuareg, who felt they had been 
progressively marginalized throughout the post-independence era and willfully ignored by the 
Traoré regime during the devastating droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, launched the rebellion to 
demand autonomy (some rebels even wanted independence) for northern Mali.  Traoré was 
forced to deploy two-thirds of the total strength of the military, about 4000 men, to the troubled 
northern region, and, while a large part of Mali’s armed forces struggled to stop approximately 
200 Tuareg rebels in the North, pro-democracy movements gained strength in Bamako and other 
major cities (3).  In October, the Comité Nationale d’Initiative Démocratique (CNID), the 
Alliance Démocratique du Mali (ADEMA), and the Association des Élèves et Étudiants du Mali 
(AEEM) formed in Bamako and, backed by the national workers’ union, the Union Nationale 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Under Keita, the Malian military violently suppressed the First Tuareg Rebellion (1963-64).  They poisoned wells, 
indiscriminately killing civilians and cattle in addition and publicly executed local chiefs and religious leaders 
(Lecocq 2010). 
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des Travailleurs Maliens (UNTM), a body that had previously acted as almost an extension of 
the single party, immediately set to work to pressure Traoré to allow multiparty elections.          
In the face of these growing calls for multiparty democracy, Traoré and top party leaders 
attempted to maintain their power by organizing regional and national discussions on 
decentralization, with the stated objective of devolving significant power to local governments 
across Mali by 1991.  In an effort to strengthen his position as his popularity waned, Traoré 
argued that full-blown democracy could not be implemented overnight and that the best way to 
begin the process of democratization in Mali was to build on the administrative reforms 
introduced in 1977 rather than allow for the creation of opposition parties (L’Essor 9 May 1990).  
Accordingly, the National Seminar on Decentralization passed resolutions advising the 
government to define the “transferable functions” that collectivités territoriales would exercise 
under increased decentralization and to gradually establish rural communes from 
arrondissements while maintaining the local and regional development councils the government 
had previously established at the regional and cercle levels of the administration  (L’Essor 9 Mai 
1990).  However, Traoré’s tactics only strengthened the opposition’s rejection of his single-party 
regime, and, as reported by Les Échos (11 to 25 May 1990), the newspaper founded by Alpha 
Oumar Konaré in 1989, the Malian public saw through the National Seminar on Decentralization 
as an attempt by Traoré and his allies to evade calls for democracy.   
Traoré continued to stress the complicated nature of democratization in his public 
remarks.  In a speech to the opening session of a meeting of the National Council of the UDPM, 
he highlighted the importance of democratization “within the [single] party,” arguing that a 
model of democracy cannot simply be imported wholesale from another country (L’Essor 
Hebdo. 30 June-1 July 1990).  Two months later, the National Council of the UDPM decided to 
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continue discussion of the possible adoption of multiparty democracy to their next meeting 
scheduled for March 1991 (L’Essor 27 August 1990).  Within this difficult context, Traoré grew 
desperate to quiet pro-democracy groups, and, in early January 1991, his government signed the 
Tamanrasset Agreement with the Tuareg rebels.  Among other things, the agreement was 
intended to facilitate the return of government troops to the capital, and a few days after 
government representatives and rebel groups signed the ceasefire, Traoré appointed General 
Sekou Ly, a stalwart supporter of the regime, as Minister of the Interior.  Ly quickly moved to 
“suspend ADEMA, CNID, and AEEM from all political activities,” arresting prodemocracy 
leaders and blocking ADEMA and CNID from holding scheduled meetings (Imperato 1991, 27).  
On January 21, 1991, the military used grenades and tear gas to break up student protests in 
Bamako and several regional capitals, killing up to five protestors (Turrittin 1991, 101). 7   
Unfortunately for Traoré, Malians perceived the hastily crafted Tamanrasset Agreement 
to be a capitulation to rebel demands, while the military was becoming “increasingly split 
between supporters of the regime and dissenters,” further damaging the tenuous position of the 
dictatorship (Villalón and Idrissa 2005, 54).  Many in the military hierarchy did not like the 
terms of the Tamanrasset Agreement (Diarrah 1996, 42), and rank-and-file soldiers “were sure 
they hadn’t won only because they hadn’t received enough weapons from Bamako” (Poulton and 
ag Youssouf 1998, 60).  In addition to a ceasefire, the terms of the agreement included the 
demilitarization of the North, an exchange of prisoners, integration of rebels into the Malian 
armed forces, and the vague notion of a “special status” for the North that would give the 
northern regions some undefined degree of autonomy.  These terms were not immediately shared 
with or explained to the Malian people, and, when it came to light that the government had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Jane Turrittin (1991, 101) reports that four to five protestors were killed, but according to newspaper articles from 
the time, official government figures put the number of protestor deaths at two (L’Essor 28 January 1991).	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agreed to a statut particulier for the North, an arrangement that granted the North significant 
autonomy along with a government guarantee to allocate 47 percent of the special investment 
budget to the region over the next four years, Malians were enraged.  The government sought to 
represent this arrangement as an integral part of a comprehensive decentralization scheme (Les 
Échos 11 January 1991), but it came too late to salvage the government’s credibility as pro-
democracy demonstrations intensified in major cities across the country.     
On March 22, 1991, following sporadic pro-democracy protests and strikes throughout 
the month, General Traoré declared a state of emergency and deployed the military to quell a 
pro-democracy protest in Bamako that had turned violent.  Though reports vary, at least 30 
protestors were killed and many more injured over the course of the day.  Outraged, the public 
responded with continuing demonstrations on March 23.  According to reports, five women were 
killed in front of the Ministry of Defense as they protested government violence against students 
and at least 65 people died after they were trapped in a building fire in Bamako’s commercial 
district (Turrittin 1991, 102).  Elsewhere, the Minister of Education was beaten to death by 
student protestors (Imperato and Imperato 2008, xlviii).  As violence worsened, Traoré finally 
agreed to meet with representatives of AEEM, CNID, ADEMA, and the UNTM on the third day 
of protests.  He agreed to lift the state of emergency and release political prisoners, but the pro-
democracy coalition rejected these concessions and demanded President Traoré’s resignation, the 
dissolution of the National Assembly, and the drafting of a new constitution (Clark 1995, 212).  
Finally, in the early morning hours of March 26, two days before the scheduled UDPM meeting 
at which the National Council was to take up the issue of multiparty democracy, the commander 
of the presidential guard, then Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), arrested 
Traoré and top members of his administration.  In an effort to restore the image of the military, 
	   47	  
the Conseil de Réconciliation Nationale (CRN), led by ATT and a group of military officers, 
suspended the constitution and dissolved the UDPM (Diarrah 1996, 27).  A few days later, the 
CRN and the pro-democracy coalition jointly announced their intention to quickly organize 
democratic elections.  
 
C. Conclusion 
 Though presidents Keita and Traoré at times took timid steps toward decentralization, in 
practice, these governments only applied limited deconcentration in their administrations, and 
the subnational units of government that were the products of these limited reforms remained 
accountable to the central government.  This was not unique to Mali.  Across Francophone West 
Africa, following independence, “even where democratic local government was written into the 
constitution or given special legal protections, the reforms led to growing central government 
control” (Ribot 2002, 6).  However, as Julien Félix (1996, 2-3) has emphasized, it is still 
important to remember that, though the idea of decentralization pushed by Konaré’s 
administration “proceed[ed] from an obvious rupture with the political-administrative system 
born at independence,” decentralization was by no means a new idea.   
For the first time since Mali’s late colonial period, the reforms introduced by the Konaré 
administration were designed as devolution in that they created autonomous subnational 
governments across the country.  Perhaps development practitioners and the Malian political 
elite had reason to place increased hope in the potential of the decentralization reforms 
introduced by Konaré’s democratic government to produce improved governance and 
development outcomes.  However, in addition to the developmentalist goals of decentralization, 
there seemed to be a collective amnesia that all decentralization reforms – whether 
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deconcentration or devolution – are also driven by political imperatives.  The following chapter 
provides an analysis of the political factors that influenced the Konaré government’s decision to 
decentralize.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Development of a new Decentralization Policy under he Konaré Administration 
 
 Mali’s transitional government, led by Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), followed suit of 
multiple francophone African countries and convened a National Conference in late July 1991 to 
draft a new democratic constitution.  Across francophone Africa, national conferences, which 
brought together representatives of civil society and government, became the primary means by 
which civil society attempted to institute multiparty democracy at the end of the Cold War.  A 
part of the so-called democratic third wave, Mali, often coupled with Benin as having one of the 
most successful democratic transitions through a National Conference, was the only state to first 
experience a coup d’état and establish an interim government before holding its National 
Conference (Wing 2008, 62).  Multiple commentators argue that Mali’s transition was especially 
extraordinary because in a little under two years the political system was transformed “from a 
highly authoritarian regime to one which ha[d] all the trappings of a liberal democracy,” 
(Vengroff 1993, 541).   
 Over the course of two weeks from 29 July to 13 August 1991, participants in Mali’s 
National Conference discussed major issues facing the nation and approved a draft constitution, a 
charter for political parties, and an electoral code.  Multiple scholars have analyzed Mali’s 
National Conference, so I will not go into detail here (see Diarrah 1996 and Wing 2008); 
however, it is necessary to review the conclusions of the Conference as relates to 
decentralization.  Using language similar to that of Mali’s 1960 Constitution, the 1992 
Constitution drafted by the Conference recognizes collectivités territoriales (i.e. subnational 
governments), “freely administered” by elected councils, to be defined by later law.  Though this 
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constitutional language is rather vague, the National Conference specifically recommended the 
elimination of constraints that had hindered past decentralization efforts in Mali and supported 
the transfer of significant authority to redefined, decentralized governments as a way to promote 
local development (Diarrah 1996, 35).  In Susanna Wing’s (2008, 81) words, the National 
Conference “paved the way for decentralization,” as Conference participants “overwhelmingly 
agreed that democracy would depend on the incorporation of local interests and concerns into 
government.”  The Constitution was approved by referendum on January 12, 1992 and, in April, 
Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected the first president of the Third Republic of Mali.        
 Though, as Toumani Djimé Diallo (1995, 11) has written, the conclusions of the National 
Conference and the 1992 Constitution made it “incumbent upon” Konaré “to ensure the profound 
transformation of the national territorial administration” through decentralization, it was largely 
left to Konaré’s administration to determine the design of decentralization reforms and how and 
when to implement them.  Understanding why “ambitious” decentralization reforms came to 
hold such “political centrality” for Konaré’s administration in the 1990s is crucial to 
understanding the process of decentralization in Mali (Villalón and Idrissa 2005, 61).  It appears 
that the Konaré administration sought to consolidate democracy through decentralization within 
a difficult political climate that made it difficult to accomplish little else.  The following 
cartoons, published around the anniversary of Konaré’s first year in office, demonstrate the 
extreme pressure Konaré was under during the early years of his administration.  The cartoon 
from Le Républicain, depicts President Konaré as he struggles to carry Mali while fighting the 
Tuareg separatists in the North and dragging the country’s political, social, and economic 
problems with him.  The more dramatic cartoon from Les Échos depicts Konaré struggling to 
pilot the sinking ship of “Mali.”  While the boat might pitch, he hopes it would not sink.   
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Figure 1: Le Républicain 9 June 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Les Échos 4 June 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is evident from these cartoons that Konaré struggled to keep the new democratic 
regime afloat in the early years of his presidency and faced the same intransigent challenges that 
had contributed to Traoré’s removal from power in 1991.  As the government tried to contain 
resurgent violence in the North, it was unable to immediately spur economic development and 
found it difficult to address the mistrust of the state by Malian citizens that had grown throughout 
Traoré’s rule.  Konaré’s first two prime ministers were forced to resign over public discontent 
with the inability of the new government to improve living standards as it continued to 
implement donor-prescribed austerity measures.  Within this difficult political economic climate, 
decentralization became more than a theoretical exercise to strengthen democratic governance 
and spark development.  The Konaré administration aggressively pursued decentralization 
reforms as one way to build its legitimacy in the face of multiple challenges threatening the 
stability of the new democratic regime. 
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A. External Support 
Before discussing the internal political and economic forces that helped drive 
decentralization in Mali, it is necessary to address the argument that the primary reason the 
Konaré administration implemented decentralization reforms was because donors promoted, or 
even required them as a condition of foreign assistance.  While international discourse absolutely 
impacted decentralization in Mali, and donors have since provided significant financial support 
for decentralization in the country, there is little evidence that an overriding reason Konaré’s 
government adopted the reforms in the 1990s was to satisfy donors.  Today, donors strongly 
encourage decentralization in Mali through a wide range of projects, but their support was less 
forthcoming in the early 1990s.   
According to Manor (1999, 24), at the time, “the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund tended to lag behind governments in less developed countries” that embraced 
decentralization.  And, while bilateral donors were quicker than the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) to recognize the promise of decentralization reforms, they “tended to support 
decentralized institutions once they were created rather than pressuring recipient governments to 
experiment with decentralization” (25).  Additionally, though the promise of decentralization to 
promote development and improved governance became a popular concept in international 
development circles as early as the 1980s when donors increasingly began to shift their emphasis 
from large-scale development programs to grassroots projects, largely rhetorical support for the 
reforms cannot completely explain why the Konaré administration pursued decentralization so 
aggressively in the 1990s.  Donor support impacted decentralization reforms in Mali, but it did 
not dictate decentralization policies.  In fact, Isaline Bergamaschi (2009, 223) argues that 
decentralization is an exceptional policy in Mali because in a country where the “mentality of aid 
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dependence” has checked the government’s “ability to come up with nationally owned” 
development policies, decentralization stands out as one of the few programs for which the 
Malian government developed a national vision.  
Julien Félix (1996) has argued that the IFIs supported decentralization reforms in Mali 
because they believed the reforms would promote the further disengagement of the central state 
from the economy to the benefit of the private sector (see also Ribot 2002).  However, though 
theoretically, decentralization fits within the context of neoliberal reforms prescribed by SAPs, 
the World Bank and the IMF had not established explicit policies to promote decentralization by 
the early 1990s, nor was decentralization a conditionality of the 1990 SAP agreement that the 
Konaré government had inherited from Traoré.  IMF and World Bank officials designed Mali’s 
1990 SAP (1) to increase incentives for the private sector through deregulation and the 
restructuring of the tax system; and (2) to improve public resources management by reducing the 
size of the civil service and addressing corruption (World Bank 2007, 7-8).  The IFIs tacitly 
supported decentralization efforts, but they were hesitant to make decentralization a 
conditionality of loans.  As Nelson Kasfir (1993, 43) has argued, a priority for IFIs at the time 
was to “remove unproductive government officials from” overburdened state payrolls, and 
“decentralization [would] likely expand employment without guaranteeing the funds to make 
new local governments effective.”  
While the IFIs were hesitant to push decentralization, bilateral donors, other multilateral 
donors, and NGOs were more supportive of decentralization reforms, which, according to Félix 
(1996), they saw as a way to promote local development.  The Mission de Décentralisation 
(MD) would have struggled to carry out its mission without the access to international experts 
and financial assistance it received from mostly bilateral donors.  According to Bergamaschi 
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(2008, 235), though “political visions for the project [were] very strong on the Malian side, 
implementation modalities were initially weakly defined and dependent on external financial 
sources.”  According to one USAID assessment, between 1993 and 1998, donors including 
Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) committed over $6 million to finance MD operating 
costs and programs (Lippman and Lewis 1998, 14).  USAID, for instance, “fully support[ed]” 
decentralization by 1991, working with the municipal governments inherited from the previous 
regime and financing MD-sponsored local and regional study and mobilization groups (GREM 
and GLEM) on decentralization after their creation (13).     
When compared to the approximately € 120 million the European Commission gave to 
support decentralization in Mali from 2000 to 2009 (Pousse 2012, 1), this $6 million over five 
years does not seem significant, but the Konaré government would have had a difficult time 
financing decentralization efforts without it.  Especially because, as Robin-Edward Poulton and 
Ibrahim ag Youssouf forcefully argue, donors provided “virtually no financial support” for 
Mali’s young democracy and expressed,  
nothing but skepticism as the new President and his inexperienced ministers 
struggled with the problems of rebellious Tuaregs, revolting students, recalcitrant 
youth groups, subversive political opponents of democracy, an antagonistic 
civilian administration, a suspicious military, an empty treasury and a taxation 
system which had not functioned for [several years] (1998, 67). 
 
That said, I must reiterate that the implementation of decentralization reforms in the 
1990s was not designed as a “theatrical performance” to meet donor demands  (Ribot and Oyono 
2005, 211).  Though bilateral donors were quicker than the IFIs to recognize the promise of 
decentralization, they also approached large-scale decentralization reforms with caution.  
According to Ousmane Sy (2009, 111), who directed the MD throughout its lifetime and was 
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later appointed to lead the Ministère de l’Administration territoriale et des Collectivités locales 
(MATCL), the international specialists with whom the MD worked recommended that the 
government implement decentralization slowly and create test municipalities to assess the risks 
of devolving significant responsibility to autonomous subnational governments before 
establishing local governments throughout the country.  As we know, the MD rejected these 
recommendations and created 682 new municipalities throughout the country by 1996.   
Donors did not push decentralization reforms as strongly in the early 1990s as they do 
today, and donor support cannot explain the Konaré administration’s indefatigable support for 
the reforms as the MD worked to establish legal texts and organize the creation of new 
municipalities throughout Mali.  It appears that Konaré “seized on an internationally popular idea 
to accomplish his own particular ends within the context of rapid political and economic 
changes” (Oxhorn 2004, 299).  As his regime came under increasing criticism in the late 1980s, 
President Traoré had tried to use decentralization to liberalize while maintaining control of the 
single-party.  Konaré regarded decentralization as a way to consolidate the new democratic 
regime and strengthen the credibility of his administration in the face of seemingly intractable 
challenges.   
 
B. The Crise Sociale 
 According to the former Director of the MD, Ousmane Sy (2009, 64), Konaré and his top 
advisors believed that decentralization was “the first step in the construction of a new Mali,” of 
which ADEMA’s pro-democracy militants “had long dreamed.”  Specifically, decentralization 
would widen the democratic base at the local level and make democracy meaningful for all 
Malians, thus “deepen[ing] the democratization process begun in 1991” (110).  Clearly, Konaré 
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and his administration embraced the theory that decentralization would strengthen democratic 
governance; however, I argue that they proceeded with the implementation of decentralization 
reforms to boost the legitimacy of the new democratic regime within a difficult political 
environment.  Despite international praise for Mali’s transition, the foundations of the Third 
Republic “were weakened to the extreme” by “the Tuareg rebellion in the north, corporatist 
disputes, student revolts, [and] peasant demands,” all of which contributed to Mali’s crise 
sociale.  Within this context, the resource-constrained Konaré administration initiated sweeping 
decentralization reforms to set the new government apart from the “predatory and authoritarian” 
regimes of the First and Second Republics, positioning decentralization as the “principal battle 
horse” through which to build government legitimacy to address the multiple crises that plagued 
the administration and strengthen the young democracy. (Kassibo 1997, 2)   
Upon his inauguration, Konaré immediately had to find ways to constructively engage 
students, civil servants, merchants, workers, farmers, and other civil society groups that had 
gained a voice with the collapse of the previous regime and perpetuated the crise sociale during 
the early years of the new administration.  After thirty years of authoritarian rule, many of these 
groups, distrustful of state institutions and government intentions, continued to organize strikes, 
demonstrate in the streets of Bamako, and demand improvements in their particular economic 
situations, what they perceived to be “the benefits of democratization” (Félix 1996, 11).  For 
instance, rural Malians, represented by groups of farmers, herders, and others, who felt that the 
Traoré and Keita governments had ignored rural issues while extracting resources from villages 
to finance the development of towns and cities, demanded low-cost inputs and price supports for 
agricultural products.  However, while they spoke of the necessity of improving rural incomes, 
they were hesitant to embrace the idea of a national strategy for rural development and did not 
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want to continue to pay taxes to the State, further hindering the government’s ability to act 
(L’Essor 6 August 1991).  In some instances, tax collectors were barred from entering towns and 
villages, and visits by administration officials, including Konaré, who spoke of the need for “all 
taxpayers [to] pay their taxes to replenish state coffers” drained by the previous regime, were 
unable to diffuse the situation (Les Échos 21 May 1993). 
In Bamako and other urban areas, workers, merchants, students, and unemployed 
graduates organized strikes and public demonstrations to demand the improvement of their 
economic situations.  The Malian press most closely covered protests led by the Association des 
Élèves et Étudiants du Mali (AEEM) not only because AEEM demonstrations were extremely 
disruptive, but also because the student union had gained significant credibility from the role it 
played in Traoré’s overthrow.  Students frequently took to the streets to demand the fulfillment 
of promises made to them by the transitional government, including increased stipends for 
university students and the extension of stipends to high school students (Smith 1997, 250).  On 
April 5, 1993, AEEM demonstrations grew entirely out of control as students set the National 
Assembly on fire and vandalized Jamana, the cultural cooperative founded by Konaré in the 
1980s.  In addition, protestors vandalized the private homes of President Konaré, the defense 
minister, the education minister, and top civil servants in the Ministry of Education (Diarrah 
1996, 278).  The protests rocked the new government and forced the resignation of Konaré’s first 
prime minister, Younoussi Touré, a few days later.                 
While the demands of the student movement were largely specific to AEEM members, as 
Claude Fay (1995, 2) has written, they were significant on a larger scale because they expressed 
“the discontent of a sacrificed clientele” that reflected the general attitude of the public towards 
the State.  The new government was caught in a difficult situation.  It lacked the financial means 
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to address the demands of each special interest group directly, and, though Konaré had been a 
well-respected leader of the pro-democracy movement, his government did not have the 
legitimacy to negotiate an end to protests, strikes, and other forms of resistance by these groups.  
Traoré had completely bankrupted the state, and the IMF was withholding vital funds because 
the government was having a difficult time implementing the terms of Mali’s SAP in the face of 
public discontent.  Additionally, the breakdown of the patron-client system that had helped to 
keep Traoré and his colleagues in power and the inability of the previous regime to deliver even 
the most basic public services left civil society unwilling to trust the young Konaré 
administration’s promises.  To make matters worse, throughout the transition, the political 
parties that formed from the pro-democracy movement had consistently expressed their firm 
belief that pluralism would resolve many of Mali’s economic problems (Imperato 1991, 26).  
However, Mali’s economy contracted during the first years of Konaré’s administration, making it 
even almost impossible for the government to address the public demands that proliferated after 
the transition or demonstrate that IMF-mandated reforms would eventually lead to economic 
growth.       
The violent student protests that led to the fall of Prime Minister Touré’s government in 
April 1993, were followed by continued protests and strikes by teachers, civil servants, and 
workers, some of which, ironically enough, were organized to protest the inability of the State to 
guarantee security in Bamako.  Unable to address the crise sociale, the Konaré administration 
made the swift implementation of significant decentralization reforms, launched in January 1993, 
its central strategy to try to reclaim the credibility of the state.  President Konaré was intent on 
restoring the “authority of the state… ‘not with muscles, but by the application of the law’” (Le 
Républicain 9 June 1993), and, as Félix (1996, 13-4) has argued, the government saw 
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decentralization as a way to consolidate democracy and give “new legitimacy to the State”  by 
drawing citizens into the decision-making process in a constructive manner.   
President Konaré’s 1993 Independence Day speech makes clear that the government, 
with few other options, sought to use decentralization to legitimize the new democratic regime in 
the eyes of Malians and respond to the multiple crises gripping the country.  At the beginning of 
the speech, Konaré recognizes that Mali is at a difficult point in its history, but seeks to point out 
that Mali is not alone by referring to all of Africa as “a land of despair” in an “anguished world.”  
He urges Malians to “fight harder,” while at the same time he asks for their patience, reminding 
“peasants, workers, the unemployed, students, businessmen, civil servants, and members of the 
military,” that because of the financial constraints on the state, not all of their problems can be 
addressed at the same time.  Konaré addresses unpopular measures, including the privatization of 
key economic sectors and the necessity of reducing government expenditures in the face of a 
shrinking GDP; however, he also points out that “soon, democracy will feed on the 
decentralization of public power,” a project that Konaré believes will be “formidable work for 
the entrepreneurs of [Mali].” (L’Essor 23 September 1993)  Approximately two months after this 
speech, the MD set the GREM and GLEM to work to “explain [decentralization reforms] to the 
populations of the 12,000 villages of Mali” (Sy 2009, 100).     
The perceived urgency of implementing decentralization reforms to legitimize the new 
democratic regime was reinforced, a few months later, by the resignation of Konaré’s second 
prime minister, Abdoulaye Sekou Sow, on February 2, 1994.  After less than a year in office, 
Prime Minister Sow left amidst disagreements with his party following the fallout from the 
devaluation of the CFA in mid-January and renewed strikes and protests across the country.  
Despite his best efforts to work with AEEM, Sow felt that another “confrontation” with the 
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group similar to the événements of April 5, 1993 “seemed inevitable” (Les Échos 4 February 
1994).  A few days after Sow’s resignation, students again staged violent protests in Bamako, 
attacking the education minister’s house to demand increases in their stipends. 
In response, newly appointed Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK), the man 
credited with quelling the violence that plagued the first years of the Konaré administration, 
quickly formed a new, no-nonsense government.  He closed all secondary and post-secondary 
schools, arrested student leaders, and closed several radio stations that had close ties to AEEM 
and opposition parties.  As IBK remained unyielding in the face of criticism and labor strikes, 
and the press talked of little else than the negative impacts of devaluation, it is no coincidence 
that Ousmane Sy gave an interview to Les Échos (18 February 1994) to highlight the work of the 
MD.  In the interview, Sy explained that decentralization will enable local populations to manage 
their own affairs and lead their own development and that the Council of Ministers recently 
expanded MD’s mission for three more years to “attack the implementation” of the reforms.  
Over the next year, the MD drafted the Code des Collectivités Territoriales (Law No. 95-034) 
that, approved in April 1995, defined the governing bodies of municipalities, cercles, and regions 
and the responsibilities they would exercise and worked with localities across Mali to create 682 
new municipalities.  
During the first few years of Konaré’s administration, the government seemed to be 
perpetually on the defensive.  While the administration struggled to implement the widely 
unpopular SAP agreement and balance the competing priorities of civil society, decentralization 
stood out as one of the few proactive, government-owned policies the administration was able to 
introduce.  At the concertations regionals, meetings organized by IBK’s government in August 
and September 1994 to broaden public debate beyond Bamako and break the crise sociale, of the 
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major issues discussed, decentralization stood out as the only proactive domestic policy issue.  
The other major domestic issues participants debated were largely problems facing the country: 
the “problem of the North,” the academic crisis, continuing insecurity, and the consequences of 
structural adjustment and the devaluation of the CFA (Diarrah 1996, 287).  Within an intractable 
political climate in which the government had a difficult time achieving little else, the Konaré 
administration not only recognized the promise of decentralization reforms to strengthen 
democratic governance in Mali, but used them to build the legitimacy of the new government.   
 
C. The “Problem of the North” 
 Most commentators agree that the Second Tuareg Rebellion, the conflict that played out 
in northern Mali from 1990 to 1996, also drove the Konaré administration’s decision to speedily 
implement large-scale decentralization reforms across the county.  Scholars like Jennifer Seely 
(2001) go so far as to imply that the Konaré administration designed and implemented 
decentralization reforms to coopt the Tuareg rebels and their supporters into a unified Mali.  
While I would argue that the “Tuareg problem” was one of multiple issues the Konaré 
administration sought to address through decentralization, there is no doubt that the government 
also pursued decentralization reforms to fulfill the terms of the National Pact, the peace 
agreement signed between Tuareg rebel groups and the transitional government in April 1992 
following the collapse of the Tamanrasset Agreement.  Speaking to the press following a 
national workshop on the early development of what became one of Mali’s key decentralization 
laws, Ousmane Sy asserted that one of the priorities of the MD was to incorporate “the spirit and 
contents of the [National] Pact” into the government’s decentralization policy (L’Essor 28 June 
1993).        
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   The conflict in the North posed “an immediate and potentially serious challenge” to the 
new Konaré administration (Villalón and Idrissa 2005, 60).  It completely destabilized northern 
Mali, threatened the unity of the Malian state, and, as demonstrated by the role it had played in 
the fall of Traoré’s regime, had the potential to disrupt politics in Bamako.  Furthermore, “three 
years of fitful battle [had] only demonstrated the Malian army’s incompetence against the 
nomadic warriors and its frustrated brutality against civilian populations” (Rawson 2000, 276).  
Thus, to bring an end to the conflict, the Konaré administration had little choice but to follow 
through on the significant commitments made by the transition government in the National Pact 
to integrate ex-rebels into the Malian military and administration, demilitarize the North, 
repatriate the population displaced by the conflict, create special development funds for the 
North, and recognize the “special status” of the three northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and 
newly-created Kidal.  This “special status” would enable the North to exercise significant 
autonomy through elected governments to be created at the local, district, and regional levels.   
 Though, as Rawson (2000, 276) has argued, the National Pact’s “timeline was 
unrealistically tight,” and the government had few resources to dedicate to its implementation, 
when Konaré assumed the presidency, many were hopeful that the Tuareg Rebellion would be 
brought to a swift resolution.  In 1993, the creation of development funds for the North seemed a 
distant dream, but the Commissariat au Nord, the agency created within the President’s office to 
implement the National Pact, was “a hive of activity,” and, that February, an agreement was 
reached to integrate over 600 militants into the military and administration (Poulton and Ag 
Youssouf 1998, 68).  The government also set in motion decentralization reforms through which 
it would seek to honor its commitment to grant the North increased autonomy.  
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Seely (2001, 502-3) has argued that the Konaré administration’s decentralization policy 
“began as a means to placate the rebellious Tuareg regions with promises of political autonomy,” 
and that the administration “extend[ed] decentralization to the rest of the country… to legitimate 
[the government’s] commitment to [the] devolution [of] power in the North in the eyes of the 
Tuareg separatists” (516).  However, this is not completely accurate.  If anything, Konaré’s 
administration worked to grant increased autonomy to the North through decentralization as a 
way to make some of the promises of the National Pact more palatable to the rest of the Malian 
population.  As Poulton and Ag Youssouf (1998, 101) have written, 
the promise, in the 1992 National Pact, of a significant degree of autonomy for the 
North, a “special status,” caused a good deal of unease in Mali mainly because its 
meaning had not been defined.  No one denied the need to reform the socio-
political structures of governance, but the creation of the Region of Kidal with 
such a tiny population, and satisfaction of demands for greater autonomy for the 
three northern Regions, were difficult to sell in the south.  The re-organization of 
the North was made politically acceptable in the rest of Mali by the commitment 
of the elected democratic government to decentralize the whole of Mali.  
 
It is also important to remember that though the necessity of ending the Tuareg Rebellion drove 
decentralization forward, “the depth of commitment to the project suggests that it has much 
deeper roots” beyond the Tuareg issue (Villalón and Idrissa 2005, 62).  The National Conference 
conceived decentralization to be “the antidote to the administrative centralism” of Traoré’s 
corrupt regime (Rawson 2000, 284), and, as I have shown, Konaré’s administration committed 
itself to decentralization to strengthen the new democratic regime and build the legitimacy of the 
government and his administration in the face of social discontent. 
Additionally, the decision by the Konaré administration to grant increased autonomy to 
the North through decentralization rather than through a “special status” did not legitimize the 
government’s commitment to the National Pact for the Tuareg rebels.  In fact, by proposing to 
meet its commitment to increased autonomy for the North through nationwide decentralization 
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reforms that were only in the early stages of development, Konaré’s government was actually 
delaying the  “commune, arrondissement, cercle, [and] regional assembl[y]” elections in the 
North that, according to the National Pact should have been “organized six months after the 
signature of the [agreement]” (article 73).  Additionally, Tuareg negotiators had made clear from 
early on in peace negotiations that they wanted a “special status” for the North, something that 
decentralization could not deliver.  At talks for the failed Tamanrasset Agreement, 
representatives of the rebellion rejected the idea of decentralization because they felt it only 
disguised increasing government centralization (Les Échos 24 June 1994).  Even after Traoré’s 
overthrow, Tuareg negotiators continued to reject the idea that proposals to decentralize the 
entire country would adequately address their demands for increased autonomy.  At the National 
Conference, Tuareg representatives pushed for the inclusion of a “special status” for the North in 
the Constitution, arguing that it was “the most important clause of the Tamanrasset Agreement,” 
and that only a “special status” would correctly recognize the “cultural, sociological, and 
geographical” specificity of the northern regions of Mali (L’Essor 7 August 1991).  
 Though Seely’s thesis that decentralization reforms in Mali were designed primarily to 
address the “Tuareg Problem” is a little strong, by undertaking to meet the terms of increased 
autonomy for the North through nationwide decentralization reforms, the Konaré administration 
reinforced its commitment to the swift implementation of those reforms.  The only way the 
government would succeed in convincing the Tuareg rebels that it was committed to granting the 
North autonomy through decentralization was to quickly implement reforms that would grant a 
significant degree of autonomy to subnational governments throughout Mali.  As Seely (2001, 
516) has argued, and we have seen in this thesis, “historically, all Malians had been misled by 
governmental promises of decentralization, so more than words were necessary to prove the 
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government’s commitment to the plan.”  Coupled with the administration’s need to strengthen its 
legitimacy to end the crise sociale, the necessity of ending the conflict in the North helped to 
drive the swift implementation of decentralization reforms in Mali in the 1990s.  
 
D. Additional Considerations 
 Without attempting to investigate their claims, or even clearly explaining them, Chéibane 
Coulibaly, Tyler Dickovick, and James Thomson (2010, 10) suggest that Konaré’s 
administration might have had other political incentives for implementing decentralization 
beyond its “noble and pragmatic” motivations.  Clearly, the administration saw decentralization 
as a way to consolidate democracy and was driven to implement decentralization reforms to meet 
the terms of the National Pact and to strengthen its legitimacy so that it could address the crise 
sociale.  However, these authors posit that the administration might also have had “more venal” 
reasons for introducing decentralization reform, and that these considerations might help to 
explain why decentralization in Mali has not lived up to expectations. 
 The first of these other considerations the authors suggest might have helped to drive 
decentralization in Mali was the administration’s desire to strengthen the partisan power of 
ADEMA and guarantee its place as Mali’s dominant political party within a complex, evolving 
party system.  This idea seems to come from Dickovick’s (2011, 7) theory that governments 
decentralize “to develop or strengthen regional bases for the future” when presidential partisan 
power at the national level is in decline.  While it is difficult to argue that the partisan power of 
ADEMA was in decline in the early 1990s – ADEMA won the presidency and the overwhelming 
majority of seats in the National Assembly during the 1992 elections and remained Mali’s 
leading political party until the end of the decade – we have seen that Konaré struggled to 
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address the crise sociale during his first term in office, which was marked by the “gradual 
emergence of a serious political crisis” (Villalón and Idrissa 2005, 62).  Opposition parties, 
“frustrated with their inability to match the organizational strength and popular familiarity of” 
ADEMA, frequently attacked Konaré for trying to establish ADEMA as Mali’s dominant party à 
la Traoré (Wing 2008, 155).  Early in Konaré’s presidency, “opposition deputies boycotted the 
vote in the National Assembly to protest their perceived lack of political influence,” while many 
believe that parties like CNID provoked the student movement to organize the disruptive public 
protests that almost caused the collapse of the new government (Villalón and Idrissa, 63).  In 
1997, the crise politique reached such a head that opposition parties boycotted that year’s 
legislative and presidential elections because the government had declined to reform the 
“winner-take-all” party list system for legislative elections that made it difficult for smaller 
parties to win seats in the National Assembly.   
 Within this challenging context, it would make sense for Konaré to want to build partisan 
support for ADEMA at the local level, and especially in rural areas, through decentralization 
reforms.  Perhaps Konaré wanted “to provide electoral outlets for [ADEMA’s] rank and file” 
(Coulibaly, Dickovick, and Thomson 2010, 11).  However, I have a difficult time believing that 
this was one of the primary drivers of decentralization because the MD designed municipal 
elections and municipal and cercle councils and regional assemblies to include a diversity of 
parties and interests.  Depending on the size of a municipality, the population elects between 11 
and 45 municipal councilors through a proportional list system that guarantees at least one seat to 
parties that win 5 percent of the vote.  The councilors then elect a mayor as well as 
representatives to the cercle council from amongst themselves by majority vote.    Unlike the 
“winner-take-all” legislative elections, this system gives even the smallest parties the chance to 
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be represented on municipal councils, and, because there are multiple parties competing in each 
municipality – in 2009 there were an average of 6.78 party lists registered in each municipality – 
it makes it difficult for a single party to win the majority of votes required to control the mayor’s 
office.8   
If a primary driver for Konaré in promoting decentralization had been to significantly 
strengthen his party’s power at the local level, the MD could have worked to design local 
elections that would have guaranteed ADEMA’s primacy on municipal councils.  While it might 
have proven difficult for the government to amend the electoral code originally adopted in 1992, 
the MD could have designed a system of government that included the direct election of mayors 
and cercle and regional councilors.  ADEMA did win a staggering number of municipal council 
seats – 6,244 out of 10,545 – in the first nationwide municipal elections in 1998/99, but that was 
to be expected.  With “it’s origins in several parties [that] became clandestine organizations after 
the seizure of power by Traoré in 1968,” ADEMA emerged from the transition as one of the only 
political parties with “established organizations in every cercle and arrondissement in Mali, and 
in many rural villages and urban neighborhoods” (Vengroff 1993, 546).  However, controlling 59 
percent of nationwide municipal council seats did not guarantee ADEMA control of mayors’ 
offices.  In municipalities where ADEMA won only a plurality of the vote, opposition parties 
could cooperate to claim the mayor’s office and seats in cercle councils and regional assemblies.  
After the devastating 1997 legislative elections, boycotted by the opposition, there were “high 
levels of participation by opposition parties in [municipal] elections and in the new commune-
level governments” established in 1998 and 1999 (Seely 2001, 517).  
Coulibaly, Dickovick, and Thomson (2010, 11) also suggest that state actors – both the 
political elite active in Konaré’s administration and well-placed bureaucrats – may have helped 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Numbers for the 2009 election calculated from results reported by MATCL. 
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to push decentralization forward to “expand opportunities for patronage and rent collection” by 
“extending formal governance down to [the] local level.”  While possible, again, I am not 
convinced that this was one of the primary drivers of decentralization in Mali.  First, as I have 
argued above, it appears that Konaré and top members of his administration were trying to 
escape the patronage system that had helped to support Traoré’s regime, if, for no other reason, 
the government simply could not afford it.  As Villalón and Idrissa (2005, 61) have argued, 
despite serious setbacks, “under President Konaré the challenge of building a new democratic 
state was taken up seriously from the beginning of his presidency,” and decentralization was one 
of the “innovative measures” introduced by the administration to strengthen the young 
democratic regime.  Secondly, “well-placed bureaucrats” outside of the Konaré administration’s 
inner circle were not supportive of decentralization and, thus, played a limited role in the design 
and early implementation of decentralization policies.   
President Konaré, Sy, and other advisors created the MD as a semi-autonomous, twelve-
member board to prevent bureaucrats in the Ministry of Territorial Administration from 
obstructing reforms as they had under Traoré, and the MD was given increased power 
throughout its lifetime to overcome the resistance of officials from across the government who 
opposed the implementation of decentralization reforms.  According to Sy (2009, 97), at an early 
meeting convened by the MD to explain plans for decentralization to ministries and agencies 
from across the government, government officials called the reforms unrealistic.  They argued 
that the reforms were too complex, would be ineffective, had not delivered results when 
attempted in the past, and could seriously threaten the unity of Mali.  In 1994, after the MD was 
moved to the office of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Territorial Administration wrote a 
letter to newly appointed Prime Minister IBK to express the concern of the territorial 
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administrators throughout Mali – the governors, commandants de cercle, and chefs de 
arrondissement – that they would be replaced by the new municipal, cercle, and regional 
governments proposed by decentralization (102).  As Poulton and Ag Youssouf (1998, 29) have 
written, many officials within the public administration were “entrenched against change, against 
reform, against any threat to their personal hegemony.”   
The decentralization pushed by the Konaré administration was not primarily designed as 
“a power play” through which the ADEMA-controlled government sought to “build up its 
footholds at the subnational level, either for future electoral purposes or for opportunities to 
increase its leverage by extending patronage down to actors at the local level” (Dickovick 2013, 
10).  However, that is not to say the central government did not “foresee advantages from 
decentralization.”  In the years following the transition, in which the survival of the new 
democratic regime remained in question, Konaré and his administration saw decentralization as a 
way to make democracy meaningful for everyday Malians and strengthen the legitimacy of the 
new government to address the crise sociale and the Tuareg Rebellion.  
 
E. Conclusion 
 Clearly, political motivations drove the speedy design and implementation of 
decentralization reforms in Mali in the early 1990s.  A former UNDP economist, MD Director, 
Ousmane Sy was “an articulate spokesman for a highly theorized argument about the imperative 
of decentralization for ‘democracy,’ ‘development,’ and, indeed, ‘modernity’” (Villalón and 
Idrissa 2005, 62).  Today, as the newly appointed Minister of Decentralization, he remains a 
strong proponent of decentralization reforms, and the promise of those reforms to strengthen 
democracy and development.  However, the necessity of building legitimacy for the new 
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democratic government and ending the Tuareg rebellion were the primary drivers of 
decentralization during Konaré’s first administration.  These motivations kept decentralization 
reforms at the top of the government agenda and impacted the design of reforms and the 
sequence in which they were implemented.  As Dickovick and Riedl (2010, 56) have written, 
because the primary goals of decentralization in 1990s Mali were to build the legitimacy of the 
democratic regime and stabilize the situation in the North, the MD focused more on democracy 
than “service delivery and development” as intended outcomes.  Thus, in the 1990s, while the 
MD did a commendable job creating municipal governments and promoting local elections, it 
devoted little effort to developing effective systems that would ensure the transfer of financial 
resources from central ministries to subnational governments, which would enable those 
governments to carry out their new development functions.  
As the political situation in Mali evolved and the crises that plagued the government 
during the first shaky years of Konaré’s presidency became less acute, the central government’s 
need to push decentralization forward also weakened.  According to Wing and Kassibo (2010, 
16), “decentralization progressively lost steam as a mobilizing project and discourse” under 
ATT’s administration (2002-2012) “because the political returns to national politicians in 
invoking decentralization” also fell.  However, this political shift happened before ATT’s 
presidency.  Seely (2001, 517) argues that, “after a big show of commitment to decentralization 
and its speedy implementation in the early days of Konaré’s presidency, the reform lost some 
momentum when the Tuareg threat subsided.”  While I must reiterate that the Tuareg threat was 
only one driver of decentralization in Mali, Seely is correct in her observation that 
decentralization reforms lost momentum in the late 1990s.  After the local government elections 
of 1998 and 1999, the MD was again absorbed by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and 
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shortly thereafter disbanded. Ousmane Sy was promoted to Minister of Territorial 
Administration, but he was less able to push through reforms as head of this unwieldy ministry 
than he was as leader of the small, but powerful MD.  This shift in central government support 
for decentralization in the late 1990s left the country with partially implemented reforms, which 
can and should be praised for strengthening democratic governance at the local level, but left 
local governments without the tools necessary to promote effective development.       
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions  
 
My objective in this thesis was to understand why the Konaré administration initiated 
significant decentralization reforms in 1990s Mali and consider how the administration’s 
motivations for decentralization impacted those reforms.  Though why a central government 
decides to pursue decentralization is just one part of a larger political process, it is an important 
factor that, until recently, has largely been neglected by the literature on the wave of 
decentralization that began in the 1980s and 1990s.  Mali offers a good case study because, like 
many African governments it embraced significant decentralization following its transition to 
democracy in 1991, impressively instituting “functional and irreversible” reforms, but, 
ultimately, failing to consolidate them (MATCL 2011, 27).  As Jesse Ribot and Phil René Oyono 
(2005, 209) have argued, this is a common pattern across Africa, where, despite the hope that the 
latest wave of decentralization would usher in devolution, like past attempts, recent policy 
changes have mostly led to deconcentration.  Across Africa, “a lack of decentralization in the 
fiscal and administrative dimensions has hindered local autonomy,” even in countries like Mali 
that hold regular local government elections.     
Under President Konaré, the government successfully created local governments and 
established regular elections that attract significant participation.  In a country where the turnout 
for presidential elections in 2002 and 2007 did not reach 40 percent and turnout for the 2002 and 
2007 legislative elections was a dismal 26 and 32.19 percent, respectively, the turnout rate for 
the 2004 municipal elections was 43.06 percent, while, in 2009, 44.61 percent of voters 
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participated in municipal elections.9  However, approximately twenty years after the Konaré 
administration initiated decentralization reforms, the central government still does not make 
adequate financial transfers that would enable local governments to effectively exercise the 
significant responsibilities transferred to them in sectors like health, education, and water, and 
local governments have little capacity and few opportunities to raise their own revenues.   
The line ministries that control these sectors have resisted the implementation of resource 
transfers mandated by law, and successive prime ministers have been unable to push the 
ministries to make them.  Though local governments have assumed many of the functions 
transferred to them under the law, it is “mainly with external funds” that some local governments 
have been able to make significant investments in these sectors (Particp GmbH 2012a, 135).  
Additionally, agents of the central administration continue to exercise tutelle, or oversight over 
municipal and district councils and regional assemblies, in many cases limiting the authority of 
subnational governments.  For instance, prefects, who serve at the district level of administration, 
must approve municipal budgets and multi-year development plans before they can be 
implemented.  According to Moussa Djiré (2004, 6), this supervisory role was given to prefects 
to ensure that municipal government decisions conform to Malian law and provide inexperienced 
councils someone they could turn to for advice and support.  However, some of these 
administrators have a tendency to impose their will on municipal councils.  As a former prefect 
in Sikasso told Chéibane Coulibaly, Tyler Dickovick, and James Thomson (2010, 22), he 
believed that his supervisory role gave him fonctions régaliennes over municipal governments.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Voter turnout for the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections was 38.57 and 36.24 percent, respectively.  Numbers for 
national-level elections come from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International 
IDEA), http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=145.  Numbers for voter turnout for municipal elections come 
from MATCL (2011, 37). 
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Many countries continue to consistently end up with deconcentration rather than the 
devolution promoted by central governments as a way to strengthen democracy and development 
because, “no matter what the official justification, decentralization is largely driven and 
continually shaped by politics and institutional dynamics” (Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke 2011, 1).  
This has clearly been the case across Mali’s history since colonization.  As we saw in chapter 2, 
the French twice introduced decentralization reforms in French West Africa – after World War I 
and World War II – to maintain control over their colonies.  Idealists at the time argued that the 
reforms implemented in the AOF after World War I “would lead to improved local wellbeing,” 
and the French government justified the reforms “in terms of local self-determination” (Ribot 
and Oyono 2004, 206).  However, as Alice Conklin (1997) has argued, the French were more 
concerned with containing the demands of the évolués for political equality and the revolts of 
rural subjects against the colonial administration than they were with implementing a more 
representative administration.  Thus, once the political situation quieted somewhat, and it 
became clear that canton chiefs installed through the reforms would collaborate with the colonial 
administration and évolués were somewhat appeased by the seats they gained in newly-created 
municipal governments, the colonial administration left its plans to decentralize power within the 
colonial administration partially implemented.   
After World War II, the government of the French Fourth Republic was ultimately forced 
to implement decentralization reforms by growing demands for political autonomy from African 
députés in the National Assembly and demands for independence from more radical political 
parties and civil society groups in the AOF.  In 1955, the National Assembly finally approved 
municipal reforms introduced by African députés in 1951 to create more municipalities across 
the AOF, and, a year later, the National Assembly adopted the Loi-Cadre, reforms that devolved 
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a significant degree of power to territorial assemblies established in each colony after the war.  
However, this final attempt to preserve the colonies as part of the French empire failed, and all 
colonies of the AOF declared their independence by 1960. 
As chapter 3 shows, the progress made towards decentralization in the late colonial 
period was reversed following independence as the leaders of newly independent states across 
West Africa tried to consolidate their power.  Mali’s first president, Modibo Keita established a 
highly centralized, authoritarian system as he tried to create a socialist state, and, in 1968, 
Moussa Traoré, the army officer who overthrew Keita and quickly established a military 
government, further centralized power in Mali.  However, after Traoré established a single-party, 
civilian state in 1979, decentralization again became an official government policy.  The 
government established development councils at the cercle level of administration across Mali, 
but they were dominated by members of the single-party and only ever held consultative powers 
to government administrators because the Ministry of the Interior, unwilling to cede power to 
regional and sub-regional party leaders, resisted giving the councils any real influence.  This 
remained an acceptable outcome to Traoré and his close advisors who relied on “pseudo-
democratic gestures” to justify their rule (Villalón and Idrissa 2005, 52), until the pro-democracy 
movement gained strength in 1990.  Under increased pressure from the pro-democracy 
movement, the government redoubled its push for decentralization reforms as a way to liberalize 
without introducing multiparty democracy, but these efforts came too late to save the crumbling 
regime.    
After the transition, it appears that, unlike previous regimes, the Konaré government truly 
viewed decentralization as a way to build democracy in the first shaky years of the Third 
Republic.  Konaré was a democratizer.  However, similar to past reform efforts, government 
	   76	  
support for the implementation of decentralization reforms in the 1990s was driven by political 
imperatives and emerged from its need to strengthen its legitimacy and bring the Tuareg 
rebellion to an end.  Within this climate, Mali’s Mission de Décentralisation (MD), constituted 
in 1993, focused more on designing structures that would promote democratic rather than 
“service delivery and development” outcomes (Dickovick and Riedl 2010, 56), and, as the 
political situation in Mali evolved, and the government’s need to aggressively push 
decentralization reforms weakened, the fiscal and administrative dimensions of decentralization 
in Mali were left incomplete.   
Facing very different circumstances when he came to power in 2002, Amadou Toumani 
Touré’s (ATT) administration saw no need to reinforce the decentralization efforts introduced by 
the Konaré administration.  Ten years after orchestrating the coup d’état that finally removed 
dictator Moussa Traoré from power in 1991 and overseeing Mali’s yearlong transition to 
democracy, ATT still enjoyed broad popular support in Mali.  Though his status as an 
independent candidate did raise “legitimate concerns,” support from the political establishment, 
which perceived ATT’s independent status “as useful for overcoming the party squabbles that 
had characterized” Konaré’s term in office, saw him elected in 2002 and again in 2007 (De Jorio, 
2012).   
Throughout his two administrations, ATT famously sought to bring all political parties 
together to govern through consensus, and most of Mali’s major political parties joined a 
coalition behind his policies.  However, consensus became so important to ATT that it became a 
goal in and of itself (De Jorio, 2012), and, in his efforts to please all, some reforms and policy 
initiatives, including decentralization, were left by the wayside.  According to Whitehouse (2012, 
17), “Touré’s ‘rule by consensus’ became a euphemism for the suppression of political debate 
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and a trend towards absolutism.”  While Konaré had been largely criticized for the “exclusionary 
methods” of his administration during his presidency, as De Jorio (2012) writes, after ATT’s 
administration took over, Malian professionals “waxed nostalgic” for the “openness of public 
dialogues and the enthusiasm for citizens’ participation,” under Konaré.  
My analysis shows that decentralization is not a technical, development intervention that 
can be easily implemented and evaluated to show that it produces desired outcomes.  It “is a 
multidimensional process that proceeds with successes and setbacks,” and, as such, “is subject to 
the continuous process of modification reflecting changes in social, political, and economic 
conditions” (Parker 1995, 43).  Because intergovernmental relations are not static, periods of 
decentralization are followed by periods of recentralization (Dickovick 2012), and, according to 
Ribot (2002, 3), few decentralization reforms have ever been fully implemented because “strong 
decentralizations threaten many actors.”  In reality, it is difficult “to imagine a more intensely 
political process than decentralization” because no matter the design of reforms, decentralization 
“involves changing the institutional rules that divide resources and responsibilities among levels 
of government” (Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke 2010, 1).   
This may seem like a simple conclusion to draw, but after years of false starts, when 
decentralization gained popularity in the late 1980s and 1990s, development practitioners 
became hyper focused on the developmental value of decentralization and paid little, if any 
attention to the politics of decentralization.  Over the past couple of decades, the non-recognition 
of decentralization as a political process has contributed to the “disappointing performance of 
donor support for decentralization relative to the substantial volume of resources devoted to it” 
(Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke 2010, xix).  Recently, donors like USAID (2009, 96) have 
increasingly come to emphasize the centrality of politics to decentralization and that “progress” 
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on decentralization reforms “will occur in fits and starts.”  Additionally scholar-authored reports 
for USAID have warned of the necessity for development practitioners to understand the 
political incentives of central government actors in supporting decentralization because, 
otherwise, donor “emphasis on political will and good leadership combined with the assumption 
that decentralization will lead to positive results, can lead to overly optimistic programming” 
(Dickovick and Riedl 2010, 8).  Yet, we continue to see this “overly optimistic programming” at 
play.   
For instance, in Mali, though donors recognized in the late 2000s that “decentralization 
seem[ed] to have stalled,” and the support for decentralization within the central government had 
dissipated (Pousse 2012, 31), they continued to pour money into the reforms.  In 2010, the 
European Commission, one of the largest supporters of decentralization in Mali, initiated the 5 
year, €75 million PARADER program.  The program includes €31 million in direct project 
support to promote regional development, regional assemblies, state reform, and the Direction 
Nationale des Collectivités Territoriale (DNCT), within the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and provides €44 million in sector budget support, the majority of which is 
“directed towards” the Agence Nationale d’Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales 
(ANICT), the Malian agency created in 2000 to provide grants to municipalities for special 
projects and help bridge development gaps between municipalities (81). 
The design of the PARADER program combines the two types of donor support for 
decentralization – policy support and promotion at the national level and project support at the 
subnational level – the merits of which have been debated in the literature (Dickovick 2013, 1).  
However, donors should not be preoccupied by which type of support best promotes 
decentralization.  Both are necessary.  Rather, donors should consider the timing of their support 
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for decentralization reforms.   It has been demonstrated time and again that “decentralization is 
weaker when pushed by donors in the absence of… incentives” that drive central governments to 
decentralize (11).  Thus, to promote more sustainable decentralization policies, donors should 
provide more financial support when governments demonstrate a strong commitment to 
decentralization.  Just think of what the MD might have been able to accomplish in Mali if 
donors had provided the agency with €75 million over five years beginning in 1993.  
Additionally, if donors had provided strong support for the Konaré administration’s 
decentralization plans in the 1990s, they would have had more success in promoting necessary 
elements of decentralization, like resource transfers, than they did once genuine support for 
decentralization reforms dried up under ATT.  When central government support for 
decentralization seems to wane, donors also need to have the flexibility to be able to pull back on 
funding.  Realistically, donors will have to continue to provide support for local governments 
during these droughts of central government support; however, if donors provided significant 
support to the development of sustainable decentralization reforms when the central government 
drove them forward, local governments should be better prepared to support themselves and 
maybe even advocate for themselves during periods when the central government seeks to 
recentralize power. 
Today, as President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) tries to rebuild the government and 
broker a peace deal with Tuareg rebels in the North, it seems that another period of strong 
government support for decentralization reforms has arrived in Mali.  In fact, the issues that 
IBK’s administration faces seem eerily similar to those that confronted the Konaré 
administration in the 1990s when, as Prime Minister, IBK helped to promote decentralization as 
a way to strengthen democracy.  IBK is trying to resuscitate democracy in Mali after the 2012 
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coup d’état while simultaneously trying to negotiate a peace agreement with the Tuareg who 
were able to briefly take control of parts of northern Mali following the coup d’état in coalition 
with Islamist regel groups.  Since its democratic transition in the 1990s, the international 
community had continuously heralded Mali as one of the democratic success stories in West 
Africa, but it has become clear that Malians had become increasingly disenchanted with the 
government during ATT’s two terms in office.  Touré worked to keep aid money flowing to Mali 
while members of his government pocketed significant funds, and, by the end of his second term, 
“Malians had also lost faith in the rule of law” (Dickovick 2012).  
IBK worked quickly after his August 2013 election to promote decentralization, and in 
October 2013, his government convened the “États Généreux de la Décentralisation” to discuss 
how to strengthen decentralization in Mali.  The government has begun to articulate plans in 
meetings across the country that, in addition to strengthening local governments, will advance 
régionalisation and establish regional governments headed by a popularly elected executive 
(L’Indépendent 27 February 2014).  Perhaps most importantly, Ousmane Sy, the man who led 
Mali’s decentralization effort in the 1990s and has continued to advocate for decentralization 
since, was recently named Minister of Decentralization.  Sy has already begun to give interviews 
and convene meetings throughout the country to explain renewed decentralization efforts, and 
the government is making plans for upcoming local elections.  The government’s plan will 
strengthen the decentralization reforms initiated in the 1990s, and, through regionalization, 
attempt to meet the demands of Tuareg rebels who during the current rebellion, for the first time 
in the history of the Tuareg conflict with the Malian state, become united behind a formal 
demand for independence from Mali (Lecocq and Klute 2013).   
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While donors have been vocal in their support for strengthened decentralization in Mali 
since the 2012 Tuareg rebellion and coup d’état, they are more concerned with ensuring that the 
reforms introduced in the 1990s are “fully implemented, including the appropriate transfer of 
resources and capacity to communes as outlined in the legal infrastructure for decentralization” 
(Wing 2013, 12).  However, while donors might be hesitant to support the total overhaul of 
regional governments that IBK’s administration has proposed, this is not the time to prevaricate.  
It may be risky for donors to support the creation of a federal system in Mali, and technical 
experts may show more concern for first working to get institutions right at the local level.  
However, if these are the reforms the Malian government has decided to pursue, donors should 
provide significant financial support and technical assistance now to make the reforms as 
sustainable as possible while a strong advocate like Ousmane Sy is head of the efforts that enjoy 
the support of the president.  As Sy himself is quick to point out, “the best minister of 
decentralization is the head of government” (Segbedji 2014b).                
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APPENDIX 
 
Map 1: 703 Communes of Mali 
 
Source: City Population http://www.citypopulation.de/php/mali-admin.php.   
Accessed 6 December 2013. 
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Map 2: 8 Regions of Mali + the Special District of Bamako 
 
 
Source: City Population http://www.citypopulation.de/php/mali-admin.php.   
Accessed 6 December 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
	   84	  
REFERENCES 
 
African Union. 2013. “Second edition of the Africa Day of Decentralization and local  
Development.” http://pa.au.int/en/content/second-edition-africa-day-decentralization-and-
local-development.  
Amselle, Jean-Loup. 1978. “La conscience paysanne: la révolte de Ouolossébougou,” Canadian  
Journal of African Studies 12, no. 3: 339-355. 
Armstrong, Hannah. 2013. Crisis in Mali: Root Causes and Long-Term Solutions. PeaceBrief  
149.  Washington: United States Institute of Peace.  
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB149-Crisis%20in%20Mali-
Root%20Causes%20and%20Long-Term%20Solutions.pdf.  
Association des Municipalités du Mali (AMM). 2012. Forum des Collectivités Locales sur la  
Gestion de la Crise au Mali: Une décentralisation immédiate et intégrale pour la  
sortie de crise. Bamako: AMM. http://www.amm-
mali.com/docs/forum2012/presentation.pdf.  
Beerfeltz, Hans-Jürgen. 2013. “A lever for reducing poverty,” D+C Development and  
Cooperation. http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/decentralisation-government-powers-
contributes-fighting-poverty-meaningful-ways-so-germany.  
Bennet, Valerie Plave. 1975. “Military Government in Mali,” The Journal of Modern African  
Studies 13 no. 2: 249-266. 
Bergamaschi, Isaline. 2009. “Mali: Patterns and Limits of Donor-Driven Ownership,” in Lindsay  
Whitfield, ed. The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. New  
York: Oxford University Press. 
Bingen, James R., David Robinson, and John M. Staatz. 2000. Democracy and Development in  
Mali. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 
Boone, Catherine. 2003a. Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and  
Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
---. 2003b. “Decentralization as Political Strategy in West Africa,” Comparative Political Studies  
36, no. 4: 355-380. 
Chafer, Tony. 2002. The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful  
Decolonization? Oxford: Berg. 
Clark, Andrew F. 1995. “From Military Dictatorship to Democracy: The Democratization  
Process in Mali,” Journal of Third World Studies 12, no. 1: 201-222. 
Crowder, Michael. 1964. “Indirect Rule: French and British Style.” Africa: Journal of the  
International African Institute 34, no. 3: 197-205. 
Conklin, Alice L. 1997a. A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and  
West Africa, 1895-1930. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
---. 1997b. “‘Democracy Rediscovered: Civilization through Association in French West Africa  
(1914-1930). Cahiers d’Études Africaines 37, no. 145: 59-84. 
Coulibaly, Amadi and Thea Hilhorst. 2004. Implementing Decentralisation in Mali: The  
experiences of two rural municipalities in southern Mali. London: International Institute 
for Environment and Development. 
Coulibaly, Chéibane, J. Tyler Dickovick, and James T. Thomson. 2010. Comparative  
Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Mali In-Country Assessment Report.  
Washington: USAID.   
 
	   85	  
Coulibaly, Chéibane. 2010. “La decentralization au Mali: le ‘transfert de competences’ en  
difficulté,” Land Tenure and Development Technical Committee Factsheet. French  
Development Agency.  
http://www.agter.org/bdf/_docs/ctf_coulibali_decentralisation_mali_fr.pdf.  
Crook, Richard C. and James Manor. 1998. Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and  
West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
Crook, Richard C. 2003. “Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of  
Local – Central Relations,” Public Administration and Development 23, no. 11: 77-88.  
De Jorio, Rose. 2013. “Public Debate Under Amadou Toumani Touré,” Fieldsights - Hot Spots,  
Cultural Anthropology Online. http://production.culanth.org/fieldsights/310-public-
debate-under-amadou-toumani-toure   
Delaborde, Michel. 1968. “New Developments in French-speaking Africa,” Civilisations 18, no.  
4: 620-629. 
Diarrah, Cheick Oumar. 1996. Le Défi Démocratique au Mali. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Diawara, Mamadou. 2011. “Development and Administrative Norms: The Office du Niger and  
Decentralization in French Sudan and Mali,” Africa: The Journal of the International 
Africa Institute 81, no. 3: 434-454.  
Dickovick, J. Tyler and Rachel Beatty Riedl. 2010. Comparative Assessment of Decentralization  
in Africa: Final Report and Summary of Findings. Washington: USAID. 
Dickovick, J. Tyler. 2011. Decentralization and Recentralization in Developing Countries:  
Comparative Studies from Africa and Latin America. University Park, PA: Penn State  
University Press. 
---. 2013. Foreign aid and decentralization: Policies for autonomy and programming for  
responsiveness, Working Paper No. 2013/044.  United Nations University (UNU) – 
WIDER. 
Diouf, Mamadou. 1998. “The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of the  
Originaires of the Four Communes (Senegal): A Nineteenth Century Globalization  
Project,” Development and Change 29: 671-696. 
Djiré, Moussa. 2004. The myths and realities of local governance in Sanankoroba, Mali, Making  
Decentralization Work: Issue Paper no. 130. London: International Institute for 
Environment and Development.   
Eaton, Kent and Ed Connerley. 2010. “Democracy, Development, and Security as Objectives of  
Decentralization,” in Ed Connerley, K. Eaton, and P. Smoke, eds. Making  
Decentralization Work: Democracy, Development, and Security. Boulder, CO: Lynne  
Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
Eaton, Kent, Kai Kaiser, and Paul Smoke. 2010. The Political Economy of Decentralization  
Reforms: Implications for Aid Effectiveness. Washington: The World Bank. 
Fay, Claude. 1995. “La Démocratie au Mali, ou le pouvoir en pâture,” Cahier d’Études  
Africaines 35, no. 137: 19-53. 
---. 2000. “La décentralisation dans un Cercle (Tenenkou, Mali),” in Marie-José Jolivet, ed.  
Logiques Identitaires, Logiques Territoriales. Paris: Institut de Recherche pour le  
Développement (IRD). 
Fay, Claude, Yaouaga Félix Koné, and Catherine Quiminal. 2006. Décentralisation et Pouvoirs  
en Afrique: En Contrepoint, Modèles Territoriaux Français. Paris: IRD. 
 
	   86	  
Félix, Julien. 1996. “L’Élaboration de la Politique de Décentralisation au Mali: Des Logiques  
Plurielles,” Le Bulletin de l’APAD 11. 
Gaasholt, Ole Martin. 2003. “State Decentralisation and Local Politics in Mali,” Cadernos de 
Estudos Africanos 5/6: 75-88.   
Hazard, John N. 1969. “Marxian Socialism in Africa: The Case of Mali,” Comparative Politics  
2, no. 1: 1-15. 
Heller, Patrick. 2001. “Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in Kerala,  
South Africa, and Porto Alegre,” Politics and Society 29, no. 1: 131-63. 
Hetland, Oivind. 2008. “Decentralisation and territorial reorganization in Mali: Power and the  
Institutionalization of local politics,” Norwegian Journal of Geography 62: 23-35. 
Hopkins, Nicholas S. 1969. “Socialism and Social Change in Rural Mali,” The Journal of  
Modern African Studies 7, no. 3: 457-467.  
Idelman, Eric. 2009. Decentralisation and Boundary Setting in Mali, Making Decentralization  
Work: Issue Paper no. 151. London: International Institute for Environment and  
Development.   
Imperato, James Pascal. 1991. “Mali: Downfall of a Dictator,” Africa Report 36, no. 4: 24-27. 
Imperato, James Pascal and Gavin H. Imperato. 2008. Historical Dictionary of Mali, fourth  
edition. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 
IREX. 2012. “Mali,” in Media Sustainability Index 2012. Washington: IREX.  
http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u115/Mali%202012%20Proof.pdf.  
Kasfir, Nelson. 1993. “Designs and Dilemmas of African Decentralization,” in Philip Mahwood,  
ed. Local Government in the Third World: Experience of Decentralization in Tropical 
Africa, Second edition. Africa Institute of South Africa. 
Kassibo, Bréhima. 2007. “La Décentralisation au Mali: État des Lieux,” Le Bulletin de l’APAD  
14. 
Kassibo, Bréhima. 2006. “Mali: Une Décentralisation à Double Vitesse,” in Claude Fay,  
Yaouaga Félix Koné, and Catherine Quiminal, eds. Décentralisation et Pouvoirs en  
Afrique: En Contrepoint, Modèles Territoriaux Français. Paris: IRD. 
Lambert, Michael C. 1993. “‘Making a Difference’ in Elite Ideologies of Colonized  
Francophone West Africa.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 35, no. 2: 239- 
262. 
Lecocq, Baz. 2010. Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg  
 Rebellions in Northern Mali. Boston: Brill. 
Lecocq, Baz and Georg Klute. 2013. “Tuareg separatism in Mali,” International Journal: 1-11.   
Lippman, Hal and Barbara Lewis. 1998. Democratic Decentralization in Mali: A Work in  
Progress. Washington: United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
Lewis, Martin Deming. 1962. “One Hundred Million Frenchmen: The ‘Assimilation’ Theory in  
French Colonial Policy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 4, no. 2: 129-153. 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late  
Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Manor, James. 1999. The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington: The  
World Bank. 
Mann, Gregory. 2009. “What was the Indigénat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,”  
Journal of African History 50: 331-353. 
Martin, Guy. 1976. “Socialism, Economic Development, and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,”  
Canadian Journal of African Studies 10, no. 1: 23-46. 
	   87	  
Mauxion, Aurelien. 2012. “Democracy Building: Local Elections and Governance in Northern  
Mali.” Phd diss., Northwestern University.  
Mawhood, Philip (ed.). 1993. Local Government in the Third World: Experience of  
Decentralization in Tropical Africa, Second edition. Africa Institute of South Africa. 
McNamara, Francis Terry. 1989. France in Black Africa. Washington: National Defense  
University Press. 
Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales (MATCL).  2011. Étude  
sur le Bilan et les Perspectives de la Décentralisation au Mali. Bamako: République du  
Mali. 
MATCL. 2009. Réstultat des élections communales du 26/04/2009. Bamako: République du  
Mali. 
Mission de Décentralisation et des Reforms Institutionelles (MDRI). 2000. La Commune en  
questions… Bamako: République du Mali. 
MDRI. 1999. Lois et Décrets de la Décentralisation.  Bamako: République du Mali.  
National Pact. 1992. University of Notre Dame Peace Accords Matrix.  
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/accord/62.   
Novicki, Margaret A. and Rober Rundblad. 1979. “Mali,” African Update 24, no. 4: 29.  
Ndegwa, Stephen N. and Brian Levy. 2004. “The Politics of Decentralization in Africa: A  
Comparative Analysis,” in Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh, eds. Building State Capacity  
in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons. Washington: The World Bank. 
Olowu, Dele and James S. Wunsch. 2004. Local Governanace in Africa: The Challenges of  
Democratic Decentralization. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.   
Ouedraogo, Hubert. 2003.  “Decentralisation and local governance: experiences from  
Francophone West Africa,” Public Administration & Development 23, no. 11: 97-103. 
Oxhorn, Philip. 2004. “Unraveling the Puzzle of Decentralization,” in Philip Oxhorn, Philip S.  
Tulchin, and Andrew D. Selee, eds. Decentralization, Democratic Governance, and Civil  
Society in Comparative Perspective. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.  
Oyugi, Walter O. 2000. “Decentralization for Good Governance and Development: The  
Unending Debate,” Regional Development Dialogue 21, 1: iii-xix. 
Parker, Andrew. 1995. Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development? Policy  
Research Working Paper 1475. Washington: The World Bank. 
Particip GmbH. 2012. Thematic global evaluation of the Commission support to decentralization  
processes Final Report, Volume 2a. Commission of the European Union. 
Poulton, Robin-Edward and Ibrahim ag Youssouf. 1998. A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic  
Governance, Development and African Peacemaking. Geneva: UNIDIR. 
Pousse, Emmanuel. 2012. “Field Phase – Country Note: Mali,” in Particip GmbH ed. Thematic  
Global Evaluation of the Commission Support to Decentralisation Processes Final  
Report, Volume 2c. Commission of the European Union.  
Pringle, Robert. 2006. Democratization in Mali: Putting History to Work.  Washington: United  
States Institute of Peace.  
Rawson, David. 2000. “Dimensions of Decentralization in Mali,” in R. James Bingen et al, eds.  
Democracy and Development in Mali. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.  
République du Mali. Lois et Décrets de la Décentralisation, Bamako: Mission de  
Décentralisation et des Reformes Institutionelles, 1999. 
République du Mali. 1960. La Constitution du Mali. Bamako. 
République du Mali. 1992. La Constitution du Mali. Bamako. 
	   88	  
Ribot, Jesse C. 2002. African Decentralization: Local Actors, Powers and Accountability.  
Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). 
Seely, Jennifer C. 2001 “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in  
Mali,” Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 3: 499-524.   
Ribot, Jesse C., and Phil René Oyono. 2005. “The Politics of Decentralization.” in Ben Wisner  
and Camilla Toulmin, eds. Towards a New Map of Africa. Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Rondos, Alexander G. 1979. “Mali: What Kind of Handover?” Africa Report 24, no. 1: 39-42. 
Sall, Abdoulaye. 1993. Le Pari de Décentralisation au Mali. 1. Contribution. Bamako: SOD-IFI. 
Smith, Zeric Kay. 1997. “‘From Demons to Democrats’: Mali’s Student Movement 1991-1996,”  
Review of African Political Economy 24, no. 72: 249-263. 
SNV and CEDELO. 2004. Decentralization in Mali: Putting policy into practice. Amsterdam:  
Royal Tropical Institute.  
Sy, Ousmane. 2009. Reconstuire L’Afrique: Vers Une Nouvelle Gouvernance Fondée sur les  
Dynamiques Locales. Paris: Éditions Jamana. 
Turrittin, Jane. 1991. “Mali: People Topple Traoré,” Review of African Political Economy no.  
52: 97-103. 
Whitehouse, Bruce. 2012. “What Went Wrong in Mali?” London Review of Books 34 no. 16: 17- 
18.   
World  Bank. 2007. Project Performance Assessment Report, No. 40070. Washington: The  
World Bank. 
United Cities and Local Governments. 2009. Decentralization and Local Democracy in the  
World: 2008 First Global Report. Washington: The World Bank. 
USAID. 2009. Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook. Washington: USAID. 
Vengroff, Richard. 1993. “Governance and the Transition to Democracy: Political Parties and  
the Party System in Mali,” Journal of Modern African Studies 31 no. 4: 541-562. 
Wing, Susanna D. 2008. Constructing Democracy in Transitioning Societies in Africa:  
Constitutionalism and Deliberation in Mali. New York: Palgrave. 
---. 2013. Mali’s Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict. Washington: United States  
Institute of Peace. 
Wing Susanna and Bréhima Kassibo. 2010. African Decentralization Assessment: Mali.  
Washington: USAID. 
Wunsch, James and Dele Olowu. 1990. The Failure of the Centralized State. Boulder: Westview  
Press. 
 
Newspaper Articles 
 
L’Essor. 9 May 1990. “Séminaire national sur la décentralisation: ‘La décentralisation territorial  
représente une pièce essentielle dans l’oeuvre d’édification d’un État de Démocratie  
Nationale.’” Bamako. 
L’Essor Hebdo. 30 June – 1 July 1990. “Ouverture de la 9eme session du Conseil National de  
l’UDPM: Respect absolu de la souveraineté du peuple et retablissement de la confiance  
dans la ligne de la Charte Nationale.” Bamako. 
L’Essor. 27 Aug 1990. “Clôture de la 7eme Session extraordinaire du Conseil National de  
l’UDPM: ‘La démocratie se construit par un consensus national sur un type de société  
préservant les interest individuels et collectifs.’” Bamako. 
L’Essor. 28 January 1991. “Après les événements des 21 et 22 Janvier: La sécurisation des  
	   89	  
populations et de leurs biens est une priorité absolue.” Bamako. 
L’Essor. 6 August 1991. “Nous sommes des sans voix et nous le resterons affirme en  
Commission les représentants du monde rural.” Bamako. 
L’Essor. 7 August 1991. “Problème du Nord: L’introuvable solution politique.” Bamako. 
L’Essor. 28 June 1993. “Décentralisation: Un defi et une exigence.” Bamako. 
L’Essor. 23 Sep 1993. “Message du 22 septembre: ‘Sans craindre l’effort, sans sacrifier à la  
facilité, sans céder au désespoir.’” Bamako.  
 
Les Échos. 11-25 May 1990. “Séminaire sur la décentralisation: Le pouvoir au peuple?”  
Bamako. 
Les Échos. 11 January 1991. “Paix sur notre pays!” Bamako. 
Les Échos. 29 May 1992. “Bréhima Siré Traoré, Ministre de l’Administration Territoriale: ‘Le  
Pacte national est un succès pour le peuple malien.’” Bamako. 
Les Échos. 21 May 1993. “Visite du President de la République en 2eme Region: Le langage de  
la vérité.” Bamako.  
Les Échos. 4 June 1993. “Le Naufrage” (cartoon). Bamako. 
Les Échos. 4 February 1994. “Demission du Premier Ministre: Les non-dits d’un depart.”  
Bamako. 
Les Échos. 18 February 1994. “Ousmane Sy, Chef de la Mission de Décentralisation: ‘La  
décentralisation est un approfondissement du processus démocratique.’” Bamako. 
Les Échos. 24 June 1994. “Le Pacte national, au-delà des passions.” Bamako. 
 
Le Républicain. 11 August 1993. “Le Républicain: l’hebdo le plus vendu.” Bamako. 
Le Républicain. 9 June 1993. “1er Anniversaire de la 3eme Republique” (cartoon). Bamako. 
Le Républicain. 9 June 1993. “Alpha face à la presse: Une première à encourager.” Bamako. 
 
Diallo, Toumani Djimé. 1995. “La Décentralisation? Rendre son âme au Mali profound.” Le  
Democrate Malien, special edition. July.  
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Civic-Education/1995/La-Democrate-
Malien.aspx.  
Fofana, Mamadou. 2014. “Ramata Tembely: ‘La décentralisation renforcée’ comme réponse aux  
rebellions récurrentes au nord Mali: Vers la mise en place d’exécutifs régionaux élus au  
suffrage universel.” L’Indépendant. February 27.  
http://www.maliweb.net/politique/decentralisation/ramata-tembely-la-decentralisation-
renforcee-reponse-aux-rebellions-recurrentes-au-nord-mali-vers-la-mise-en-place-
dexecutifs-regionaux-elus-au-suffrage-universel-198914.html.  
Segbedji, Bruno D. 2014a. “Formation du gouvernement Moussa Mara: La page du coup d’Etat  
du 22 mars 2012 définitivement tournée.” L’Indépendant. April 14.	  	  
http://www.maliweb.net/politique/formation-du-gouvernement-moussa-mara-page-du-
coup-detat-du-22-mars-2012-definitivement-tournee-238482.html.  
Segbedji, Bruno Djito. 2014b. “Collectivités Territoriales Et Politique De La Ville: Ousmane Sy 
de retour à la tête de la décentralisation malienne.” L’Indépendant. April 14. 
Stamatoukou. 2013. “MEPs back EU’s humanitarian aid to Mali.” New Europe Online. Brussels,  
May 17. http://www.neurope.eu/article/meps-back-eu-s-humanitarian-aid-mali.  
Sy, Ousmane. 2014. “ Décentralisation, communalization, régionalisation: “Le Mali doit  
	   90	  
s’appuyer sur sa diversité pour sortir de la crise.” L’Indépendant. March 18. 
http://www.maliweb.net/politique/decentralisation/decentralisation-communalisation-
regionalisation-le-mali-doit-sappuyer-sur-sa-diversite-pour-sortir-de-la-crise-
202905.html.  
 
	  ELIZABETH A. POLLARD 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
I. PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
Elizabeth A. Pollard 
415 N. Cedar Street 
Greensboro, NC 27401 
910-620-0166 
eapollar@umail.iu.edu or elizabethpollard@gmail.com  
 
II. EDUCATION & TRAINING 
 
Master of Public Affairs (M.P.A.)   August 2014   
School of Public and Environmental Affairs    
Indiana University      
Bloomington, Indiana 
 
International policy analysis concentration included coursework in benefit-cost analysis; 
comparative and international affairs; economic development, globalization, and 
entrepreneurship; international NGO management; microeconomics; program evaluation; public 
finance; research methodology; and statistics.  Teaching assistant for graduate class, Introduction 
to Comparative and International Affairs, for Dr. Rafi Reuveny.     
 
Master of Arts in African Studies (M.A.)  August 2014 
African Studies Program      
Indiana University     
Bloomington, Indiana 
 
Coursework included concentrated study in African political economy, contemporary Africa, 
international development, research methods, and language.  Thesis examines decentralization in 
Mali in the early 1990s. 
 
Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)    May 2005 
Sewanee: The University of the South 
Sewanee, Tennessee 
Major: Political Science 
 
Language Skills: Native English, Advanced Bamana, Conversational French (advanced reading 
proficiency) and Wolof 
 
 
 
 
 
	  III. PROFESSIONAL SKILLS  
 
A program management and research professional with diverse experience and education in 
African studies, international development, public health, public policy, legislative affairs, grant 
management and qualitative and quantitative research.  Previous work as legislative aide in the 
U.S. House of Representatives.  Experience living in sub-Saharan Africa and working with 
health professionals, domestic and international NGOs, and civil society organizations at the 
community level.      
 
IV. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Clinical Paralegal     April 2014 – Present  
Elon University School of Law 
Humanitarian Immigration Clinic 
Greensboro, N.C. 
 
Work directly with refugees, asylees, and asylum seekers.  Assist clients as they work to obtain 
immigration benefits.  Track client submissions to USCIS and provide research support.  Work 
with U.S. embassies around the world to ensure speedy visa processing for the beneficiaries of 
approved refugee/asylee relative petitions.  Manage the Clinic’s grant from the NC Refugee 
Assistance Program. 
 
Legislative Correspondent    January 2009 – June 2010 
Congressman Mike McIntyre 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Gained experience in policy analysis and project management.  Tracked legislation and analyzed 
policy on issues, including child and family, education, federal employee, Social Security, and 
the U.S. Postal Service.  Advised the Congressman and represented him in meetings with 
stakeholders.  Translated complex policy issues into concise correspondence, outreach materials, 
memos, op-eds, and talking points.  Managed several projects, including the development of a 
new website.  Managed incoming correspondence, maintaining the database of over 40,000 
constituents and coordinating staff to write timely outgoing correspondence.   
 
Staff Assistant     September 2008 – January 2009 
Congressman Mike McIntyre 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Gained experience managing an office.  Ensured the distribution of key supplies to four North 
Carolina district offices and coordinated the Congressman’s support to constituents during 
President Obama’s 2009 Inauguration, including the distribution of inauguration tickets.  
Assisted staff with research and constituent correspondence and managed interns. 
 
 
 
 
	  Temporary International Support Associate May – September 2008 
American Bar Association (ABA) Rule of Law Initiative 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Gained experience in operations for an international NGO as liaison between ABA offices in 
Washington and international legal volunteers in the field.  Managed monthly mailings to field 
offices in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe and assisted program staff with the implementation 
of volunteer training.    
 
Health Education Volunteer   September 2005 – September 2007 
U. S. Peace Corps 
Republic of Mali 
 
Gained experience managing projects at a rural community health center in a developing 
country.  In addition to daily outreach responsibilities at the health center, facilitated the 
development of a child survival program that covered over 1,000 children from zero to two years 
of age in the ten villages of the health center district.  Wrote a successful grant proposal to 
USAID and implemented a training for two local women from each village to support health 
clinic staff in the implementation of the program.  Designed and implemented a nutrition 
education training for fourteen mothers with malnourished children.  Worked closely with the 
mayor’s office and community groups to develop a grant proposal for the NGO, Engineers 
without Borders, to build a bridge on the main road to the village where the health center was 
located that would provide uninterrupted access during rainy season.  At the organizational level, 
served as co-chair of the Volunteer Advisory Committee (VAC) that addressed issues of concern 
for volunteers and Peace Corps Mali senior staff and helped to develop new country office 
policies at quarterly meetings.  As a volunteer participant in the “Training, Design, and 
Evaluation Workshop,” developed new learning objective for Peace Corps Mali training 
alongside senior staff and Malian counterparts.   
 
V. SERVICE 
 
Volunteer English Tutor     October 2013 – March 2014  
Interfaith Refugee Ministry 
Wilmington, NC 
 
Assisted a Burmese refugee family with integration into the Wilmington community through 
weekly English tutoring and home visits.  
 
President      January – December 2012 
Indiana University Graduate Students in African Studies 
Bloomington, IN 
 
Led coordination of organization’s academic and social activities, including planning of the 
annual graduate student symposium that attracts graduate student participants from universities 
across the United States.     
 
	  Vice President     September 2011 – May 2012 
Indiana University Returned Peace Corps Volunteers 
Bloomington, IN 
 
Assisted with coordination of all organization activities and represented the IU RPCV group and 
Peace Corps at campus events.    
 
VI. AWARDS 
 
Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowship: 2012-2013 academic year award for 
advanced Bambara study; 2012 summer award for advanced Wolof study in Dakar, Senegal; 
2011-2012 academic year award for advanced Wolof study; 2011 summer award for 
intermediate Wolof study in Dakar, Senegal 
 
Pi Alpha Alpha National Honor Society for Public Affairs and Administration, Indiana 
University (2013) 
 
Pi Sigma Alpha National Political Science Honor Society, Sewanee: The University of the South 
(2004) 
 
